

Arcana Aulica:
OR
WALSINGHAM'S
MANUAL;
OF
Prudential Maxims,
FOR THE
STATES-MAN
And the
COURTIER.




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PRESS
CHICAGO, ILL.
1964



THE
PRINTER
TO THE
Discreet and Understanding
READER.

A **H** Ere is a Childe
of Chance, that
like another Mo-
ses in a Wicker
Basket, was lately put to
Sea ; and by the Hand of

To the Reader.

Providence guided unto this shore, as unto *Pharaoh's* Daughter; by the taking of a small *Irish* Pyrate, in which it was found; and appearing a Babe both promising, and very beautiful, was recommended unto me to Nurse. Of what Birth it is, I can give no certain account; all that I can assure you of, is this, That having perused it through, some very knowing persons have affirmed, That
our

To the Reader.

Our Language is yet enriched with nothing upon this Subject equal unto it. The Clothes that it was wrapt in, say little towards the discovery of its Parents; for it was directed as a present unto *Ormond*, the Titular Vice-Roy of *Ireland*, from one *Walsingham*; who though he professes to have given it this *English* Habit it now wears, yet he is able to name no Father for it: Whether it be some other

To the Reader.

nameless Author ; as he affirms, that first gave it light, I must of necessity leave that as doubtful as I found it : And it is a needless curiosity to enquire further, since no man is injured in that concealment, but the Author ; who it seems is well content to loose the glory of it. What value this *Walsingham* sets upon it, you may read in a part of his Letter unto *Ormond*, which I here insert.

Your

To the Reader.

Your Excellency will
herewith receive a
peice, that if not too much
lessened in passing through,
and from the hand that
sends it, truly not unwor-
thy the acceptance of so
great a Person. It is some
years since I first met with
it in a Manuscript, and in
a Foreign Language, when
I took so great a fancy to
it, That it hath ever since
been an inseparable Com-
panion, a daily Manual

To the Reader.

unto me : I have since that time found it published in Latine, but still as nameless as at our first acquaintance. The divulging of it, seriously, I did much lament, and that for a twofold Reason ; One was, to see it come abroad so lamely, and so much injured ; another was, to finde it divulged at all : For surely, it is a Tract not intended for the unskilful palate of the vulgar ; and indeed, onely meant, and fit for the wisest souls,

To the Reader.

souls, and the maturest, and best tempered Judgements. And the most part of men are either by nature so depraved, that they cannot forbear the practise of those evils, that they finde discoursed upon, onely for their instruction; or else so sand-blinde and ignorant, that they must needs be scandalized with, and stumble at those Precepts which are here recommended unto no mans practise, but laid by the Authors skiful hand

To the Reader.

hand, as necessary Sea-marks upon the Shelves of danger and deceit; of which, the Ocean of a Publique life, God knows, is full. And a little after he adds, In this small Volume, you will finde (my Lord) enbaced skilfully together as precious Jewels, the choicest Precepts that Story and Experience both together, have produced for the instruction of those that move within the sphere of Business, and the Court: It is a curious
Land-

To the Reader.

Landskip, wherein that great Territory, with all the blemishes and beauties of it, is all contracted to an easie view: It is a perfect Compass fitted to those Seas, with Points adapted to every wind that blows there: It is an exact Card, describing all the Coast; and as there is not a Rode, a Creek, or Harbor, overpast in all that Channel; so is there not a Rock, a Flat, or Quick-sand that is omitted. But surely it is done to keep us from

To the Reader.

from, and not to lead us to
those dangers, &c.

This, and more delivers
he in commendations of
it ; and what he says, can-
not but be of some Au-
thority in the case : Since
upon enquiry I do finde,
That he is one, who
though very yong, in a
little time grew up under
the Wings and Favor of
the Lord *Digby*, to such
credit with the late King,
That he came to be admit-
ted

To the Reader.

ted to the greatest Trusts ;
and was prevented onely
by the fall of the Court
it self, from climbing
there unto an eminenter
height.

This much Reader I
thought fit to say for thy
satisfaction, and by way of
civility to him ; contrary
to whose design I have
published this *Treatise* ,
and until another Father
can be found for it , have
prefixt his name unto it,
under

To the Reader.
under the Title of his
Mannual.

Farewel.

THE



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ARCANA AULICA,







OR

Walsinghams Manual ;

Of Prudential Maxims, for the Statesman and the Courtier.

CHAP. I.

*The several ends of Courtiers, and the
means to maintain them.*







 T is necessary that all men, who desire with prudence and order, to govern their Affairs ; do in the first place, propose unto themselves, an end whereunto all their actions must tend ? Those that look towards the Court, do not all fix upon the same ends ; some the hope of gain, and others the desire of honor, leads ; the Ambition of Rule ; draws not a few ; and very many

B

steer

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steer that Course, meerly out of a busse inclination, to the Engrassing, Crossing, or Interposing in other mens affairs; whilst the number of those is very small, who Princitively intend the Honor, Safety, and Advantage of the Prince.

But though their ends be diverse, yet the way to attain, to whatever end any man there hath pitcht upon, is but one, and Common to all that move in that Sphere, to wit, the Favor of the Prince; in obtaining which the industry, and labor of all Courtiers is imployed. In order whereunto it is in the first place necessary, that you be known unto your Prince; and then either by your behavior, your parts, your actions, or some other laudable means, that you make your self Grateful in his eye; yet there are those for whom the splendor of their Family, the authority of their Office, or convenience of their imployment (whether it be high, or low, come unto them by inheritance, or got with money) hath prepared an access unto the Princes person; so that they being hereby exempted, from the toil of seeking how to become known unto the Prince, finde half their work performed unto their hands; whilst those to whom these introductions are denied, finde their greatest difficulties in their first beginnings: But when they are once known unto the Prince, as he judges them fit for his Service; they

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they are often preferred and trusted before others; by reason that being lifted up from a low Condition, or a mean Fortune; they are more addicted and subject to the Princes will, whom they submissively reverence, as the onely Author of their advancement.

It is otherwise with Courtiers that are born Great, for upon those the Dignity either of their employment, or their Family, imposes a necessity of having a regard unto their own Honor, and of referring sometimes their own to the Princes opinion; who besides is more oft unwilling to promote these through a certain emulation, or fear, lest their swelling greatness should insult at last against him that is the Author of it; and he not able to repress them without danger to himself and his Kingdom; whilst on the other side, the oppression of him that riseth from a mean Condition, is far more easy; onely let the Prince turn his back upon him, or abandon him to the great ones (who for the most part look with envy upon such) and he is lost. I intend here onely those wise Princes that have known, how to limit within due bounds, the Power of those they love, and advance; not conferring all the authority and trust of his Kingdom upon one of these men, in subjecting even the Peers unto him; which having been done by some Princes, did seldom or almost never succeed well.

CHAP. 2.

The ways to obtain the Princes favor.

THe ways whereby Courtiers get into authority and favor with the Prince are two, above all other most usual and frequented. The one is of those that seek after publick Offices and Dignities, Climbing up the stairs of honor till they come within a stage of the Favorite himself; The other is of those that follow the Court, sedulously seeking all occasions of being imployed in the secret affairs of the Prince, and made use in business of the greatest trust.

The last of which ways, is without doubt the shortest, and traced with their steps, who have lived in the greatest Favor with their Princes; as Mecenas was to Augustus, and Salust both to him, and his Successor Tiberius, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 3. Salust, although the ways of honor were easie unto him, imitating Mecenas, without the senatorial Dignity, outwent in Power many that had been honored, both with triumphs and the consulship, & varying from the custome of the Ancients through his delicacy, and neatness, seemed prone to nothing but the Plenty and aboundance of luxury; although he had indeed a vigorous minde, capable of the weightiest business; by so much the more sharp
and

and active by how much the more he made sh^w of dulness and sloth.

Like to him was Mella, of whom speaks the same Tacitus, Annal. 12. Mella born of the same Parents, that Gallio and Seneca were; through a Preposterous ambition laid aside all pretence to publick honors, to the end, that being only Roman Knight, he might equal in power those that had been Consuls; Besides, he beleaved it the shortest way to the getting of money, to be employed in Agencies, and soliciting the Princes business.

CHAP. 3.

The ways to become known to the Prince.

THe ways of becoming known and grateful to the Prince are various, according to the diversity of the Courtiers, and the times; there are some that make themselves known by their actions signally, either profitable, or glorious; or else by a more then Common vertue, and honesty. The Commendation of others gives to many, both access to, and interest in the Prince, which is indeed the most usual way of all. For Princes live in such a degree of eminence above others, and are so bedged in with the number of Peers, and train

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of *Veterane Courtiers* that a stranger can hardly thrust in amongst the throng that stand in his way, unless either there be *some one* to take him by the hand, and make his passage, or else that himself by some extraordinary enterprize do *attract the Eys* of all men upon him, and amongst others, those of the *Prince*.

And here the fact of the Architect *Dima-crates*, or as some call him *Stasirates*, is very memorable. He desiring to become known unto the *Great Alexander*, when all the *Courtiers* had refused to bring him to the King, berhinks of a way of presenting himself all naked, anointed with Oyl, a poplar Crown on his head, upon his left shoulder a Lyons Skin, and holding a great Club in his Right hand: And thus Accoutred he comes into *Alexanders* presence, as he was sitting in his Throne. The novelty of the thing drew the Eyes of all upon him, and moved *Alexander* himself so far, as he caused the man to be brought unto him; And though he approved not of what he propounded, yet he commanded he should be enrolled amongst his *Family*.

I do not bring this example to perswade any body with the like foolery, to insinuate himself into the *Princes* favor, but to the end I may demonstrate, That those who are *strangers and unknown*, unless they be holpen by

by some one in great authority, can hardly serve themselves into so great a train, as do surround the Prince, except either by some memorable action as we have said before, or by some unusual accident, they deserve as the Poet saies.

*With fingers to be pointed out,
For some strange thing amongst the rout.*

CHAP. 4.

The humor and inclinations of the Prince, and his familiars are to be known.

Our young Courtier, who desires to be known and loved by the Prince, must observe well the maners and conditions, not onely of the Prince himself, but also of such of his followers, as he most trusts and relies upon; together with the Peers, and all those others who may either afford him any help, or countenance; or else on the contrary stirred up either with emulation, fear, envy, hate, their own, or their Friends concerns, work him any prejudice. It is chiefly necessary that he make a full discovery of the inclinations and customs of the Prince, that for the most part follow the temperature of his body;

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which though by *wary Princes*, they be much concealed, and smothered, yet it seldom happens but that sometimes they *break out*, and as it were laying aside *disguises*, show themselves. Since all their actions are so exposed to the eyes of men, it cannot be, but *some one or other*, must observe whereunto their *inclinations* tend. Sometimes they are so oppressed and vexed with the weight of *business*, that forgetting their *Artifices*, they betray their dispositions; *Tiberius* himself although a most skilful *Master in dissembling*, could not set so good a face upon it, but that time would by little and little, bring all his *Arts to light*.

But since *those* of other men are so many, the propensions of *Princes* must needs be diverse, and almost infinite; yet they may be reduced to *two heads*. The one of which, includes all that tends to the greatness of his *State*, The other his *personal pleasures*; His greatness consists either in his *Fame and Authority*, or in *Riches*; the duty of his *Subjects*; or lastly, in the strength and faithfulness of his *Armies*. In these things he ought to accommodate his *endeavors* to the nature, and disposition of the *Princes* affairs; which he that shall with *Dexterity and Skill* perform, provided he be neither suspected nor hated for *other Reasons*, cannot fail of becoming acceptable unto the *Prince*.

Make

Make the same judgement of the pleasures, and vitious affections of the Prince. If he be diffident and of a fearful disposition, believe that a bold informer will be grateful unto him, who sticks not at the displeasure of the great ones, and is ready to execute the Princes commands, whatsoever they be; as Tacitus ascribes Sejanus. He had a body (says he, *Annals 4.*) patient of toyl, a bold minde; he was a close concealer of himself, and a rash accuser of others: Composed he was of a mixture of flattery, and pride, with an exterior face of modesty; and yet inwardly fraught with an excess of ambition.

If the Prince delight in Drunkenness, he will all also take pleasure in men addicted to the same vice; for which cause Tiberius loved Pomponius, and Lucius Piso, of whom Suetonius, Cap. 24. de Tiberio. After this, the Prince to the corruption of publique Maners, spent two whole days and nights, eating and drinking with Pomponius Flaccus, and Piso; to one of which, he gave immediately the Province of Syria, and to the other the Government of the City, calling them in his Letters, his most pleasant and familiar Friends. The same Tiberius, as Suetonius relates, preferred a most ignoble Fellow to the Questorship, before many Noble pretenders, because at a Banquet, where himself was drinking, he drunk of Nine Gallons of Wine.

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Their ſociety in their luſt, did indeed Ti-
gellinus to Nero. Tigellinus was more power-
ful (ſaith Tacitus, Annal. 14.) in the boſom of
the Prince, as being admitted to his moſt private
luſts. So Petronius, that Maſter of elegance
(for thoſe are the Hiſtorians words, Annal.
16.) was taken in, amongſt few, to the familiari-
ty of Nero; who thought nothing pleaſant or
ſweet, but what Petronius approved of. And
according to this example, did Commodus
and Heliogabalus, confer all the dignities of
the Empire upon men for luſt and licencious-
neſs, moſt like unto themſelves.

Mutianus was not beloved by Veſpaſian ſo
much for his fidelity, duty, and the merit of
his paſſed ſervices; as that, becauſe he was
more dexterous then others, in feeding his
avarice. To Iſacius Angelus, who after the
death of Theodorus, got the Empire; the
ſame avarice endeared a certain Boy, who
though he ſcarce knew how to write, kept
the Accounts of his Exchequer, out of hope
only of ſharing in the Bribes, which were
given him largely, from all thoſe that uſed
his aſſiſtance.

Manuel Comnenus, alſo Emperor, ſeeking
ſome rough exaſtor and crafty raiſer of his
Tributes, that might ſupply his prodigality
with money, choſe John Pucius, a rude un-
ſufferable man, difficult of access, and in-
tolerable harſh.

Whoſe

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II

Whose language, and his looks did well

His nature and his office tell.

And not content with this, lifted him up to that Authority, that he did not onely excel all others in dignity, but also would dare to violate the *Edicts* of the *Prince*, and *Orders* of the *Senate*; abrogating, under pretence of encreasing the *Treasury*, some of the greatest and most necessary *Offices* of the *Empire*: Such as was the *Commander* of the *Gallies*, the chief strength and defence of that *Imperial Monarchy*.

CHAP. 5.

The Princes affections whether, and how to be complied with.

BUt that they, who desire to become acceptable to the *Prince*, ought to sooth him in all his *inclinations*; is not onely a thing publicquely granted, but also too authorized by the *daily practice* of *Courtiers*. An honest man will wonder at it, and think that by this rule that teaches us to humor all the dispositions of the *Prince*, he is shut out from *Court*; since that *Princes* often run courses, much astray from the paths of *Reason* and *Justice*. Truly, he that desires to lead

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lead a life altogether innocent, and remote from the conversation of men addicted to vice, and to their own corrupt inclinations; shall in my opinion, do very well to absent himself from that great Courtisan, the Court (if I may so call it) that sometimes corrupts men of the greatest integrity and innocence.

Let us see an example or two of this corruption. *Festinus* the Friend of *Maximinus*, during *Valentinians* Reign, governed *Asia* with a wonderful repute of Gentleness and Modesty; being a sharp reprover of the violence and cruelties of *Maximinus*, and of the calumnies and frauds, wherewith he circumvented many: But at last observing that his Companion by these means had gotten the command of the *Prætorian Bands*, next in dignity to the Emperor himself, he changed his maner of life, and imitating *Maximinus*, did many unjust and cruel things. *John Pucius* (whom I mentioned but a little before) administred for a time the Affairs and Treasures of the Emperor *Manuel* with great integrity; which caused, that the Emperors pride and inhumanity was in some sort tolerable to those that were well disposed amongst the Subjects: But at last (as *Nicetas* witnesseth) giving himself over to the desire of wealth, he was in covetousness inferior to none, that ever had borne those offices

offices before him ; exhorting his very friends and servants, to imitate his example, as many of them did ; and the rest, though better, and incorrupted themselves, yet were fain silently to suffer others to be depraved, for fear of the danger that hung over those that should oppose him.

Aristides the first, both in name and nature, being by the *Athenians* made *Treasurer* ; In the first place, according to his own disposition, and the duty of an honest man, went about to hinder all those that were under his charge, from robbing the *Treasury* ; whereupon they presently accused him of cheating, and bribery, as one of the corruptest persons that ever bore that office ; inso-much, that he had like to have been condemned : But being at last quit, and his office still continued, he determined to imitate his *Predecessors*, and wink at the thefts of his *Companions* ; by which means, he presently reobtained the name of a good man, in the opinion of all.

Such things often fall out in the *Courts* of *Princes*, either through the malice of those that are in most authority, who can endure no man more vertuous then themselves ; or else through the folly and imprudence of the *Prince*. The preservation of our integrity in Court, I confess, is therefore very difficult ; yet if any, either through the necessity of his
Fortune,

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Fortune, the eminence of his Birth, the dignity of his office, or the desire of serving, either his Friends or Country, is lead unto it, or called thereunto by the Prince, shall undergo this kinde of life; and as occasion shall require, seek to do thereby good unto himself, and serve his Friends; in my judgement he may persist therein, without prejudice to his upright heart, at least-ways for a time.

I speak of the Courts of the worst Princes; for to live in the Court of a wise Prince, that loves honest and vertuous men, the difficulty is not so great. In times past, good men did not always undergo Publique employments with a desire of doing service to their Country, so much as meerly to keep wicked and corrupt men out of those charges: And for the same reasons, ought they to seek access unto Tyrannical, and voluptuous Princes; to the end, That if they durst not directly, at least obliquely, and as much as in them lay, they might impede the evil, and pernicious Counsels of the Prince; either by framing delays, and contriving difficulties in his way, or by offering unto him more milde and plausible resolutions.

Burthius and Seneca, who according to the rate of those times, were accounted not onely good Courtiers, but vertuous men also; when being made Governors of Nero's youth, they

they obſerved the humor of this Prince apt and prone to luſt and pleaſure; leſt he ſhould break out to the rapes of the Nobleſt Women, they permitted him a Miſtris, whereby for a time they kept him in order: Who took into his familiarity *Annaeus Serenus* for a cloak unto his luſt, Who faining to be in love with this freed Woman, did openly own thoſe gifts to be his (ſaith *Tacitus Annal 13.*) which the Prince in private beſtowed upon her. This muſt a good man do, who not being able to maſter the luxury, liberty, and perversneſs of the Prince, muſt at leaſt divert them, and bend them other ways, whence there is leaſt danger like to ariſe, either to the publick, or the Princes honor.

CHAP. 6.

*The ſcarcity and Condition of honeſt men, in corrupt and vicious Courts;
The ſwarms of ill men, and their Arts of ingratiating themſelves.*

PERhaps ſome one will ſay, that it ſeldom falls out, that a Tyrant or a diſſolute Prince, will take into his favor an honeſt man; I do not deny but it is very rare, but yet

yet I must affirm there are few *Princes Courts* in which there are not some good men found; if not call'd thither by the *Prince* at least drawn thither by their own desire of doing good to others, and infringing the power of evil men: Who stand their ground there to that end, through the assistance of the best disposed *Courtiers*, and through the friendship and patronage of some Great man observing carefully there, that wholesome rule of *Lepidus*, whom *Tacitus* (*Annal.* 4.) brings for an example of a good and wise *Courtier*, who neither with an unseasonable Contumacy did exasperate the *Prince*, nor with a sordid flattery sooth him in his vices. The same *Tacitus* for these reasons commends *Capito* and *Labeo*. That age (saith he) had at once two Ornaments of peace; But *Labeo* was of a more incorrupted liberty, and therefore more esteemed, whilst *Capito's* pleasing humor was more acceptable to the great ones.

I do not deny, but a *Courtiers* life will be far more difficult to an honest man then to another; But withall I must affirm, that the advantage of *Glory* and content of *Minde* that will arise from thence, will much recompence the trouble of it. Since that, if he carry himself wisely and accommodate himself to those things that he sees, he cannot change nor overcome; I dare say, he will at last become acceptable to the worst of
Princes,

Princes, and dearer then others that are of a worse repute; who seldom manage the *Princes* business with a due fidelity and care; or at least not equal to that he might easily promise to himself from the hands of a vertuous and honest man. And hither tends the Counsel of *Salust* and *Mecenas*, whereby the first recommended to *Julius Cesar*, and the latter to *Augustus*, the choice and friendship of Good men. Because conscience and care of their reputation restrains these more powerfully from dishonest things, then the fear of punishment, or the want of power doth others.

But as I have said, the vicious are always in *Court* in greater thrungs; who chiefly by two ways do ingratiate themselves with the *Prince* first by flattering and fulfilling whatever he shall please to command; and that by so much the more servilely, by how much the more their hopes of gain are greater. Next for that, *Princes* are pleased to have those about them in comparison of whom, themselves, though bad God knows, seem to be good. Some there are that think also their lives more secure in the company of those that are most like unto themselves. *Dionysius* the Tyrant, being requested to expel out of his *Court* one, who for his villany was hated by all men, answered, No, he would keep him, lest otherwise he himself should become

become the most hateful person in the Court. It is natural to those who finde themselves obnoxious to any vice, by comparing themselves to those that are worse, to seek to purchase to themselves some shew of probity; And it hath been an old trick of *Princes*, on purpose to choose unlikely *Successors* to the end, their own acts and vertues might appear better and more illustrious: For *Tacitus* is of opinion, that for no other reason did *Augustus* adopt *Tiberius*, whose arrogance and cruelty he knew full well; nor *Tiberius* choose *Caligula*.

It is principally necessary, that a good man be very sober and circumspect in his discourse; for *Princes* seldom or never lose an unwary and careless liberty in any kind of men, how vertuous soever they be. Neither did *Plato's* freedom with *Dionysius* succeed well, for therefore was he delivered up to a needy Marriner, and sent to be sold in the Ile of *Crete*; whence being redeemed by certain Philosophers, he was admonished either to abstain wholly from the conversation of *Princes*, or to speak plausible things: With the like advices did *Aristotle* furnish his Cousin *Callisthenes*, then going to attend upon *Alexander*, to wit, That he should very seldom speak, and then never but pleasing things, to him upon whose Tongues-end lay the disposall of his life.

CHAP. 7.

Whom, when, and how we ought to flatter; the nature of a free and tolerable flattery, and the necessity of it in Court.

THough it be inconsistent with the strictest rules of Morality and Vertue, yet of necessity, if you live in *Court*, you must sometimes so flatter the *Prince* as may gain him unto you. But all manner of flattery is not tolerable, a base and servile one was displeasing even to *Tiberius* himself, of whom it is written by *Tacitus*, *Annal. 3.* that going out of the Senate he was once heard to say of those flattering Senators in Greek; *O men born to slavery.* There are circumstances wherein flattery used, is as prejudicial, as when it is wholly omitted; For it happens often, that he whom we flatter too grossly, suspects deceit. It is requisite still that flattery have something of truth, and some show of liberty mixed with it, (it is the opinion of *Æschines* and *Plutarch*) whereby we may perswade not onely the *Prince*, that we speak heartily, and as we think, but others also, and so preserve our Credit.

Crasus

Crasus, who whilest he was a King himself, had learnt well the humor of Kings, and what would either please or displease them. When upon a time *Cambyfes*, King of the *Persians*, demanded of those that were about him, What they thought of him in Comparison of his Father *Cyrus*: They all affirmed, That he was greater then *Cyrus*, as who unto his Fathers Kingdoms had added *Egypt*, and the dominion of the Sea. When *Crasus* (then a Captive) came to speak, he affirmed, That he was much inferior to his Father, by reason that he had as yet begotten none equal to himself. This answer had some taste of freedom, and therfore was more pleasing to *Cambyfes* vanity, then all the rest had said.

That flattery is very notable of *Valerius Messala*, recorded by *Tacitus Annal. 1. Messala Valerius* added, That it was convenient the Oath of Allegiance should every yeer be renewed in *Tiberius* name; who being demanded by *Tiberius*, whether he had any commandment from him to give that advice, he answered, That he spoke it of his own accord; and that in what concernd the Common-wealth, he would use no mans advice but his own, whatever the offence or danger were: Which was a wonderful unpractised kinde of flattery.

Like unto this, is that which the same Author relates of *Ateius Capito*, *Annal. 3. Lucius Ennius*, a Gentleman of Rome, was accused of

of Treason for melting the Image of the Prince, and making it into Plate; Caesar commanded he should not be prosecuted for it: Atcius Capito, openly complained with a seeming liberty, that the power of determining in such a case ought not to be taken from the Senate, nor so great a Crime pass unpunished; and that he was slow in resenting his own, least he should also punish an injury done to the Common-wealth. It were easie to bring more examples of this kinde, but these are sufficient to instruct those upon whom there is imposed a necessity of flattering, that they may take heed, lest their flattery bring upon themselves, or others, any Private or Publick damage; it is sufficient that it be such as may sometimes satisfie thy *Princes* vanity.

CHAP. 8.

How to manage the Counsels of a Prince.

Our Courtier ought to beware how he engages himself (though called) in the Counsel of a Proud and Violent Prince; for such as those do ask Counsel in no other sort, then as Xerxes did when he went to invade Greece: He called together the *Princes* of Asia, as it were to deliberate with them

them about the Conduct of the War; but they being come before him, he said, Let I should seem without your advice to do all things according to my own will; I have called you my Lords to Counsel: yet I would have you know, that I expect here from you obedient minds, and not trouble some debates. *Cambyfes*, the Predecessor of *Xerxes*, being about to Marry his Sister, demanded of his Counsellors, whether any Law of the *Persians* prohibited such a Marriage; They perceiving the King did not ask this question, so much to resolve himself of any doubt, as to sound the dispositions of the *Nobles*, answered, That truly there was no law that warranted expressly this that the King was about to do; but there was one that affirmed, that whatever the King thought fit to do, was lawful. Thus out of the Humor of the *Prince*, and the Nature of the affair, we must first make a judgement, whether it be fit, or safe, when he asks our Counsel, to deliver freely our opinions; or to humor him in his inclinations.

You have *Royall* examples of this already, wil now bring you one of a man, who though he were not a King, yet bore the Office of a King; not above an Age agoe in *Spain*. *Ferdinand* being dead, the *Pope* and *Maximilian* the *Emperor*, exhorted, *Charls* of *Austria* then in *Flanders* to take upon him the title

of King of Spain; although his Mother *Jone*, *Ferdinands* daughter were still living, but wholly unfit for Government, by reason of her want of health. The States were here-upon assembled, and before them Cardinal *Ximenes*, to excuse the novelty of the thing, discoursed excellently of the reasons of what was done. The *Grandeess* more observant of ancient customes, and the *Queen*, then was fit against a *King* that was shortly to succeed of Course; Protested very obstinately against it. *Ximenes* being angry, rises up and tels them, *the thing that was treated of, was not to be called in question; neither was there any need of their advice in the case: That Kings being to enter upon their Kingdoms, are not to expect the consent of their Subjects; that they who were assembled, were not called out of any necessity, but that they might have occasion by the Promptitude of their suffrages to endear their Prince unto them. But since they interpreted that as a due, which was onely a favor, they should see that without their approbation he would proclaim King Charls at Madrid; which example all the rest of the Cities quickly followed.*

Such a maner of proceeding, not onely in these cases, but in all others in a maner do *Princes* use; scarce asking any mans advice, but either to the end they may Countenance their own resolutions with the consent

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sent of many, or else to discover the disposition of the person they advise withal, as *Tacitus* witnesseth that *Tiberius* oft did. The *Courtier* must therefore solicitously fitt into the *Princes* Mind, lest otherwise he should have chance to give offensive Counsel. If the *Princes* inclination in the thing debated be doubtful unto him, let him seem to discuss the matter, and so laying down arguments both for the one, and the other side, let him leave the *Prince* to his own election: Who (if the thing advised of, be not unalterably resolved upon already) having heard the reasons that may be brought against it, if he be discreet, will change his Minde.

Neither in this case will there be any ground for that bashfulness (of blushing, to seem so much inferior to any body, as to follow their Counsel) which though it be very hurtful and unbecoming unto them, is very familiar amongst great men; for having said what you can, you leave the freedom of determining all to the *Princes* prudence, whereby you will also avoid the danger that many times Counsellors are obnoxious unto, if their advices succeed ill. And if the *Prince* following his first resolutions meet not with success, he will by so much the more acknowledge and esteem the prudence of that *Courtier*, who foresaw the approaching misfortune, when it was yet avoidable.

If

If you be prest to deliver your opinion in an unlawful matter, either seek some pre-
tence of delay, or else intreat that some
third person may be called for the better
discussing of the business; whereby the
case being more maturely weighed, it may
appear what is most for the dignity and
safety of the *Prince*. By this means *Burrhus*
defeated *Neroes* first attempt against his Mo-
thers life; Promising that himself would kill
her if she were found guilty: But since it was
afforded unto every other person, a trial could not
be denied unto his Mother. Whilest the ex-
aminations are raking, *Nero's* fury asswages,
and his fears grow less, so that his determi-
nation, though it was not quite altered, yet
it was laid aside to another time.

But this manner of proceeding takes not
place upon all occasions, being proper only
in desperate and ambiguous cases. More-
over, before we adventure upon it, we
ought to know, whether the nature of the
Prince is compatible with delays: for there
are some so headlong and impatient, that
there is no means more certain of incur-
ring their displeasure, then by using de-
lays.

CHAP.

CHAP. 9.

The sudden resolutions of Princes, how to be moderated.

WHen as it often falls out, our advice is not asked in the resolution, but for the maner of execution of what is resolved upon already; if the business do seem consistent with reason and honesty, we may propose the remotest means we can think of for the effecting of it; and countenance our advice with the pretences of facility, equity, and security; shewing withal, that sudden undertakings, are full of hazard and difficulty. When we have to do with those impatient kinde of *Princes*, we ought to be ready, and have always our Wits about us for those sudden occasions, and then if they be not unsufferably rash and wilful, no doubt but they will follow the course which we shall demonstrate to be most safe and easie. Yet if their madness be such, that they will not hear milde and gentle Counsels, his adviser may yet excuse this his wary prudence with a Care and Affection to the *Prince*; desiring rather, that things should be done slowly with security, then rashly with the ruine of his Master.

Now if so be, that in that headlong course that the *Prince* hath wilfully chosen, difficulties

culties or straits do occur, he will much more reflect upon the prudence of him that would have dissuaded him in time, and perhaps for the future, be willing to hearken to him, propounding milder ways. Besides this gaining of time doth frequently afford subject of moderating the *Princes* passion, and of bridling his desires, or else of letting him see, that what he is about is either wholly impossible, or else cannot be effected without great absurdity.

For it after happens, that the ways which *Princes* propose unto themselves, are accompanied with such circumstances of difficulty, as are not to be overcome; and to these kinde of straits, as I would not have you exhort him, so I would not have you too much dissuade him from them, (rather suffer him with a respective silence to take his own course, least you dissuading out of these difficult ways, he seek out some more easie one of compassing his will;) which otherwise having toild himself out of breath amongst the Obstacles that he met with, he would voluntarily give the business over. But sometimes it falls out that *Princes* commit the execution of some Wickedness or Injustice to an honest man: In which case truly (though all good men ought to suffer any violence or misfortune rather then consent to be made the Minister of villany) I

fear the number of these is very few that are so generously resolved, as by a passive disobedience to expose themselves to the sacrifice for another; especially if the occasion offered, and the nature of the *Prince* admits of no denial, or excuse, nor affords any way of casting that displeasing imployment upon some third person.

Which later course *Burrhus* took, *Nero* resolving the second time upon his Mothers murther, full of so much the more care and eagerness, by how much the danger of her contrived Shipwrack in the *Tyber* had produced no other effect, then that the Woman always before malicious and greedy of revenge, was after so great an injury become more intraged then ever. *Burrhus* and *Seneca*, being call'd to Counsel, stood long ambiguous and doubtful what to say, as *Tacitus* reports *Annal.* 14. saying: *They were both of them a long time silent, fearing lest they dissuade in vain; At last Seneca hitherto the forwarder man, cast his eye upon Burrhus, as if he would have asked, whether the execution of that Murther should not be left to the Soldiers; Burrhus prevented him with an answer, and sayes that the Pretorian Bands were all devoted to Cæsars house, and so mindful of Germanicus, that they would act nothing of cruelty against his Progeny; and therefore that Anicetius should perform his promise. So he freed both*

both himself and his soldiers, from the execution of that ugly act.

I confess, he is not beholding unto you, whom, to save your self innocent, you shall intangle in such an imployment: But should such an occasion happen, I think it fitter that some such man as *Anicetus* was, should undergo the infamy of such an act, then any *vertuous* or *honest* man.

Yet the safest way of all is in time to foresee, and in their birth to prevent, and occur to the *unjust desires*, and the unlawful designs of the *Prince*; and before they either take Root, or appear above Ground, to suppress and pull them up. There are many, who with *seasonable* and *gentle admonitions*, and *silken words*, as *Parisates* calls them, have done much good, and had wonderful success in *these cases*; yet it is necessary, that whosoever would use such remedies as these be of *great authority* with the *Prince*, who, must hear as much out of *reverence* as *love*: And nevertheless, when all is done, though it may succeed well in *this* or *that case*, it will hardly do so in *all*. I am much pleased with the way of those men, who are of a *conceited* and *pleasant humor*, and for that faculty, acceptable with the *Prince*; who as it were, intending something else, with a *fit similitude*, or a well chosen story, will represent unto the *Prince* the danger,

and foulness of those Counsels, wherewith he seems to be carried headlong away.

But to do this, there is a great nimbleness of wit, and pleasantness of discourse required; besides, they must take heed the Prince smell not out, that himself is the argument of the jest. As *Tiberius*, who in the Tragedy of *Atreus*, composed by *Scaurus*, believed he was reproached of his Brothers murther; and *Domitian*, in that which *Helvidius* had writ of *Paris* and *Cenon*, thought himself upbraided with his divorces: Wherefore it is necessary, that these kinde of stories be skilfully interwoven amongst other things, not squaring or applyable to the Prince; and it is very pertinent to this purpose, That they take care not to inculcate too plainly, that matter which makes most to the purpose; though, least it should quite escape the Princes observation, it may be, as it were, by a casual repetition iterated. The conceit and continuance of the story, by how much the greater, and more cheerful it is, by so much the more it will imprint those things that are said; and because they seem to come by chance, not of purpose, or design, they will not distast the ticklish ear of the Prince.

For this kinde of moderation, whereby you may neither contribute to the Princes vices, nor in vain resist them; there are many critical times, and means, which
those

those that attend upon the persons, and are employed in the affairs of Princes, cannot but meet with. If so be that the case be such, that you must needs contradict the disposition and inclination of the Prince, you must seek out some other passion or humor in him, whereunto he is equally inclined, and so beget a strife and contention in the Princes minde; but we must carefully pretend still, that what we say, comes from the duty and reverence that we bear him. By this means did Matianus keep Domitian in orde, and hinder him from joyning with Cerialis, as (out of what hopes, I know not) he was about to do, says Tacitus, Hist. 4.

CHAP. 10.

The severall natures, and tempers of Princes, how to be handled; with the art of Courtiers in introducing their Companions.

YET to do these things successfully, it doth much conduce, that we know the inclinations of our Princes, which depend upon the natural temperature of their Bodies. The difference and variety of
C. 4. which,

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which is common to them with other men; except, that as they are more powerful than others, so they are less *masters* of their *affections* and *inclinations*; which are for the most part, more violent and more unreasonable in them, then in meaner persons.

He, in whom *Choler* rules, is, *Hasty*, *Proud*, and prone to *Anger*; a lover of *Ceremony*, and *Respect*; a sore enemy to those that are but in the least sort refractory; impatient in *execution*, and rash in *resolution*; a contemner of all mens opinions, that differ from his own; very apt to commit *injuries*, yet soon friends with those he hath wronged, if they renew not the memory of *passed enmities*; but a hater of those that rip up *old offences*, and to the end, he may prevent such as he is afraid of, watching all occasions of doing them a greater mischief.

Whoever hath to do with such a *Prince*, must always have his eyes and ears open, that he may readily *understand* and *obey* the *first beck*, without making any *reply* or *delay*, least by *contradiction* the *Prince* come to suspect him of *arrogance*, as one that would seem to think himself wiser then he; let him not stick to submit himself to the lowest kinde of *employments*, if need be, though they suit not with his condition. He must be *patient* of *injuries*, and no ways mindful of them; but after a *wrong*, so much the more *officious*:

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officious: He must not brag of his merits, least he should seem to reproach the *Prince* with them; but rather heap *services* upon *services*, least the memory of those that are past should wear out, and to the end, the pleasure and gratefulness of *fresh ones*, may revive the remembrance of the old. When the *Prince* is angry, let him not come near him, for all things displease him then; neither are those that are dearest unto him, grateful in any thing they can devise, to say or do. Familiarity with such humors as these, turns into contempt; which for that reason, although the *Prince* invite us to it, is to be avoided: Let all things rather tend to modesty and respect. For these *Lyons*, though sometimes they be meek and gentle, are at other times enraged against those they love best, and who are in most authority with them.

They that are of a *Sanguine Constitution*, are for the most part of a pleasant humor, lovers of mirth, and recreation; flying sadness, the seriousness of business, and trouble of debates, lovers of peace, leaving the administration of their affairs to others, in whom they suffer nothing more unwillingly, then complaints. They are courteous, gentle, and free, if not from all, at least, from any grievous injuries; more mindful of benefits received from others, then done by

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themselves & complacent, willing to help, and for the most part liberal.

He that lives with such as these, must omit no circumstances of *veneration* and *respect*, but very seldom must they treat of *business*, or serious *affairs*. Those that are employed in the greatest, and most important *Offices*, and concerns of the *Kingdom*, ought not to come near these *Princes*, before they be either called, or certain that the *Prince* is not engaged in any *recreation*; least otherwise, they should interrupt him in his greatest *delights*, and make him blush to be surprised by those, who, he may apprehend, are *secretly angry*, to see him no better entertained. For so when *Philip* of *Macedon*, was once at play, it was told him, That *Antipater* was at the door, who presently troubled, and conscious of his *transgression*, hid his dice under his *Pillow*; blushing, that *Antipater* should catch him at that sport. Therefore with such a *Prince*, as those that manage the greatest affairs of the *Kingdom*, in serious and weighty trusts do exceed others; so also are they out-gone by others, in a familiar and free access to the *Princes* person; who naturally avoids these kinde of *serious men*, as much as may be. Those men that are of a jovial and well tempered *disposition*, and capable as well of *pleasure*, as of *business*, are chiefly acceptable

acceptable to these kinde of Princes. Provided, That whilst they are out of the Princes sight, they do not with too much facility and complacence, loose their authority with others; but they must preserve the honor of their rank intire, for without that (as the Proverb says) Familiarity breeds contempt, and contempt gives encouragement to quarrels, upon the first appearance of an injury: Which the Prince being an enemy to trouble and strife, to free himself of, will endeavor to remove him that shall appear most faulty.

A Melancholly Prince is slow in his Counsels, anxious, thoughtful, diffident, jealous, witty, and for the most part peevish; given to silence, and when he speaks, involving himself in ambiguous words, a dissembler, apt rather to sound other mens opinions, then deliver his own; an enemy of jests, and freedom; a lover of solitude, difficult of access, a friend to few, and to those but coldly; prone to hatred, out of diffidence, an inseparable companion unto him; covetuous and fearful, even to absurdity; one that hates equally those that he hath offended, with those that have offended him; implacably greedy of revenge, and whom, though reconciled unto you, you ought to be jealous of.

With these kinde of dispositions, we cannot

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cannot deal with too much *wariness* and *circumspection*; principally we must take care of our *Tongues*, and call, as it were, a counsel upon every thing we say; to the end, we may speak nothing *strange* or *offensive*, nor indeed, scarce at all, unless we be called upon: In our *respect*, we must rather *exceed*, then *fall short*, and altogether *abstain* from *contradiction*, without pressing him, when he demurs in his Counsels, least his melancholly once kindled in choler, never quench till it convert to *hatred*. In our *demands*, we must not be *importunate*, when we see him deny us readily; for it is not convenient to accustom the *Prince*, to give us *repulses*, especially such a *Prince*, who being by his nature prone to ill suspicions, will think that man his enemy, that he hath given a refusal unto; neither will you easily afterward, by any skill, take this *apprehension* out of him; for with such, the memory of an *injury* endures long; and measuring others by themselves, they believe all men as *malicious*, and as obstinate in their *hatred*, as they. In short, these kinde of men are the *worst*, and most difficult of all others; and whose *temper*, by reason of the variety of *cloudy thoughts*, that hover in their *dark imaginations*, is most *unequal*; which makes their *conversation* exceeding *troublesome*.

The

The *Phlegmatick Prince* participates of the heaviness and slowness of the melancholly; but as in understanding, so in peevishness and distrust, is inferior to him; for his heart is, as it were, congealed with cold; and hence it comes to pass, that he is diffident of none so much, as of himself; fearing to undertake great matters, because he despairs of the success, and knows not how to go about it. He is doubtful in his Counsels, fearful in Execution, not of a quick capacity; and as his hate is not great, so his love is not vehement.

To supply the heaviness of these Princes, an active and ready Minister is necessary. When the Prince hath once found him capable to effect those things, that himself thought desperate, discovering the weakness of his own wit; he loves, admires, and cherishes this man, as necessary unto him. And that kinde of favor, which leans upon the opinion of such a necessity, is of all others most durable. Which our Courtier once observing, let him make it his business to bring to a prosperous issue, those businesses that seemed most difficult, and from which, the Prince expected little or no success; as it was the constant practise of that great Minister of France, Cardinal Richeleu, who always kept the King intangled in such dangerous undertakings, That if he would, he

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he knew not *how* to be without him.

Let our *Courtier* also, if it can be so contrived, compass these things, and execute the most material part of his *business* himself alone, taking heed, however he do, that he take not to his assistance, a *helper* or *companion*, more *habile* and *dexterous*, then *himself*: Withal, let him beware he be not too long absent from *Court*, least he chance to loose the *Prince*; who if he shall once finde one *more* able or useful then *him*, he will be either less valued; or at least be held less necessary; and so being laid aside once or twice, in imployments that shall succeed in *other hands*, will at last fall into *contempt*.

Wherefore it is an old art of *Courtiers*, not to take unto themselves any *Companions*, but such as in *Vertue* and *Prudence* they shall much excel; to the end, that in comparison of these, their own *lustre* may so much the more appear, and that the *Prince* being surrounded with such as these, may not easily know where to finde one, whom he may either prefer or oppose unto the *introducer* of these. Moreover, these *grosser souls*, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their *present*, and may ow their *future advancement*, are easie and obnoxious to be *debauched* by him, and ready for *corruption*, which he cannot easily expect.

pect from one that is his *equal* in condition, or in parts, and who stands upon his *own* legs. These are the several kindes of humane inclinations, whereunto *Princes* are no less *subject* then other men, inclining now to *this*, and then to that *side*, according to the prevalence of *this* or that temperature in them.

CHAP. II.

That Age, Business, Custom, and Sickness, alter the temper of the Bodies, and Constitution of the Mindes of Princes.

NOtwithstanding that for the most part things are thus, yet these rules are not infallible and without exception; for Age, Custom, and Business, alters the temper of the Bodies, yea, and the Inclinations and Affections of Princes. In the time of war, the Prince cherishes Military men, but peace being returned into his Kingdom, the Authority and Interest of these men doth soon wax old; and then, if the Prince inclines to pleasure, or any other affection, he will be
apt

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apt to save those that can serve or further him in it.

See what Tacitus writes of Tiberius, *Annal.* 6. He changed his maners strangely with the times, whilest he was a private man, and under Augustus his Government, both his life and maners were of good repute; as long as Germanicus and Drusus lived, he was close and crafty in counterfeiting vertue; as long as his Mother was alive, he kept a mean betwixt Vertue and Vice: For cruelty he was infamous, but for his Lusts as long as he either loved or feared Sejanus, secret. But in the end, he burst out into all wickedness and dishonesty, and casting away both fear and shame, he suffered himself to be carried wholly by his vicious Inclinations.

Of Caligula, this judgement of Passienus is very notable; There was never a better Servant, nor a worse Master. It is almost incredible, what variety of dispositions were found in Marius and Sylla; so that Plutarch doubts, whether Fortune wrought this change in their Natures, or onely brought to light what before of wickedness lay concealed in them. In which case, if I should speak my opinion, I would declare, I thought they did not change their Natures; but onely pull of those Masks, that fear and a narrow Fortune had musled them withal. Just as Leontius said of Zeno, That a Serpent
frozen

frozen with cold, hurts not; but warm'd by the fire, thrusts forth his sting.

Tryphon, as *Josephus* witnesses, whilest he led a private life, to win upon the people, did personate a good man; but being made a King, he threw off his disguises, and quickly let them see, that all that *vertue* which appeared in him, was forced and counterfeit: And that of *Agamemnon* is not much unlike, if what *Euripedes* writes of him be true; he was modest, affable, and easie of access, before he was chosen *Generalissimo* of the Greeks. But after that election, he became an enemy to his friends, and inaccessible to all, in keeping himself shut up, whereby he became so distastful, that the Precept the Poet gives upon this occasion, is worth recording.

*These men are wise, that great advancement gain,
And still their ancient modesty retain.*

An excellent sentence, but observed by few. *Pollio* truly seemed to follow it, if we may believe *Seneca*. Afterwards (saith he) being promoted to the highest degrees of honor, he, never corrupted by any occasion, deviated a whit, from his former modesty, temperance, and civility: He was never puffed up with prosperity, nor with the variety of business was he so disordered, or that any one could surprize him in a humor, derogating

derogating from the reputation he had gained before.

For truly, the defects and blemishes of *Princes* and *Courtiers*, proceed for the most part out of *Pride*, the inseparable handmaid of greatness. This is that makes them despise other mens counsels, being vainly perswaded, that they do excel other men, as much in *Prudence*, as they do in *Power*. And some are so carried away with this stream, that they think it below them to keep within the limits of *Law* or *Reason*; believing they cannot be *Princes*, to whom all things are not lawful, they have a minde unto, according to that of the *Poet*.

*Vertue, Truth, Faith, such private things as these,
Are not for Kings, they must do what they please.*

But if these kinde of opinions did onely corrupt the weakest, and worst of *Princes*, I should wonder the less; but I see the mindes of the best men to be blinded also with the witchcraft of *Power* and *Rule*. No man ever yet exceeded the *Seven Sages* of *Greece*, in giving *Precepts* of modesty; nor ever were there worse *Tyrants*, then such of them as came to Government. *Appianus* being to speak of *Aristo*, reckoned up not a few that bore the name of *Philosophers*, that had plaid the *Tyrants* at *Athens*; naming also

also some of the very *Pythagoreans*, who being called to Government in *Italy*, did exceedingly abuse their power; which makes me doubt much, whether most of those *Philosophers*, who so proudly contain honors and dignity, do it in good earnest, or not rather for a cloak and cover to their small deserts, their poverty and idleness. Surely, if we will believe *Aristophanes*, they did not live so frugally and neerly, so much out of virtue, as necessity; and would not refuse to feast plentifully, when ever they were invited.

CHAP. 12.

How much Impostors are able to do by flattering Princes; and how a Prince is to beware of them.

There are oftentimes *Impostors*, who with flatteries, and liidden sly suggestions, creep into the *Princes* bosom, and corrupt their nature; To these kinde of men, doth *Tacitus* impute the pride and cruelty of *Vitellius*. *Vespasian*, who was of a gentle nature, learnt from these people to oppress his subjects with heavy *Tributes*, as the same *Tacitus* affirms:

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affirms: In short, it is certain, that many who have used the service of these kinde of men, have sadly degenerated. These *Impostors* seek favor unto themselves, by showing the *Prince* ways to *Greatness, Power, and Profit*; who by so much the more willingly doth hearken to them, by how much the less he understands himself. He poor man, not reflecting, nor observing that these men praise and sooth him; to the end, they may at last betray him to *contempt*, and *expose* him to the *hatred* of his people. And truly, to humor and comply with the *Cruelty, Covetousness, and Lust* of a *Prince*, is of all others, the securest way to betray him, for he cannot condemn the *Traitor*, without discovering his own *guilt and vices*.

The *Franconians*, by the help of *Ægidius*, at that time governing in *Gaul* for the *Romans*, had expelled *Clodius Comatus* out of his Kingdom, whom one of his friends desiring to see restored, goes over to *Ægidius*, and fostered upon all occasions, as much as in him lay, the *Avarice, and Cruelty* of the man, which was but too notorious before; whence the injuries of this *Roman* growing insufferable, the *Franconians* begin to wish for their *King* again, and at last recal him to his Kingdom. Thus this honest *Franconian* made good use of his *flattery*, and by feeding him in his own *vices*,
betrayed

betrayed his *Masters* enemies. *Sejanus*, who gaped after the *Roman Empire*, see what arts he used: After he saw that *Tiberius*, who by his instinct had imprisoned *Agrippina*, and her children, grew weary of the City; spur'd that inclination on, hoping, that when the *Prince* was once retired, the *Trust* and *Government* of the *Empire* should be cast upon him, as indeed it came to pass; so that for a time, *Tiberius* was onely Lord of a little *Island*, and *Sejanus* Emperor. *Perrennius* also thirsting after the *Empire*, first circumvented and made away all those that stood in his light, under pretence of a conspiracy, that *Lucilla* had contrived against *Commodus*; and then intices the *Emperor* to pleasures, whereby he himself might come to the managing of all things, and at last attain unto the *Empire*.

The same way took *Bardas*, Uncle to *Michael*, Emperor of *Constantinople*, who having taken away *Theodistus*, his *Associate* and *Tutor* to the yong *Prince*, contrived also his *Mothers* banishment; perswading *Michael* to take the *Government* into his own hands; whose yong years incapable of rule, he soon diverted to delights, and pleasure; so as he gave himself wholly to these entertainments, and intended nothing else: *Bardas*, in the mean time, fishes eagerly after the love of the people, and to that end, converses

converses with good and learned men, restored learning in the City, and made many good Laws; by which means, he would doubtless, have slept at last into the Imperial Throne, if another had not prevented him. I do not bring these examples, that I may teach how Princes are to be circumvented, but that I would have Princes themselves learn hence, what Prudence and Caution is necessary for them to discern, and distinguish the Counsels of their Ministers; and chiefly, that they may beware of those who are apt to sooth them in, and applaud their Lusts and Vices; and learn to think well of such, as will sometimes modestly adventure to express their dislikes of their excesses.

CHAP. 13.

Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them.

HAVING considered all things, that our Courtiers was to observe in the Prince himself, let us come to his Servants, who by reason of the Offices they bear, are continually about his person, and may be useful to those that pretend at Court, either by procuring them extraordinary accesses, or by making

making seasonable mention of them, or by instructing them of the ways, times, and occasions of doing their business. There are many *Princes*, who being private, put on a quite other face, then that they bear in public; and who more willingly do trust and disclose their thoughts, to such of their Servants, as they think faithful to them, esteeming the lowness of their condition incapable of treachery, or wicked practises: Who does not know, that *Claudius* was governed by his *Freedmen*, one of which, called *Pallas*, he had so enriched, That upon a time complaining of Poverty to some body, he was advised to get *Pallas* adopt him for his Heir: By this mans perswasion, *Claudius* married *Agrippina*, after by the help of *Narcissus* (a freedman also) he had destroyed *Messalina*?

Who can be ignorant, that during the continuance of the *Eastern Empire*, the *Eunuchs* many times governed all? if that had not been so, it had been impossible for *Arbetio*, the cheif Ruler of the *Empire*, to have escaped with life, when *Verissimus* accused him. *Borilus* and *Germanus*, two slaves, by the absolute authority they had with *Boniatates*, one of the Emperors, made him an enemy to *Isacius*, and *Alexius Comnenus*.

Yet let us suppose, That the Prince does not impart his Counsels to these men, they are

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are more easily pryed into by these, then any others: For it cannot be, that *Princes* always wear their *Masks* in private, oftentimes the *throng*, and a *publike* life, makes him suppress and hide those *affections*, which when he is at liberty, and in private, do break out. Wherefore, I conclude, it is very necessary in *Courts*, To think all kinde of men, even the meanest, useful unto you. And we must believe for certain, That together with their *Authority* and *Fortune*, their *prudence* and *discretion*, will grow up; which *Arrian* demonstrates to *Epictetus* in *Epaphroditus*, and his two slaves; The one of which coming to wait upon the *Emperor* at his *Stool*, and the other to have the charge of his *Shoes*; *Epaphroditus* himself, who had sold them not long before as *unuseful*, sought now their *Favor*, and praised their *Prudence*.

Fortune hath never scarce been so favorable to any one in *Court*, as not to afford him as many *enemies* as *friends*; neither hath it ever yet cast any man so low there, as that he was neither able to hurt, nor help another: Whence it was, that in the time of *Tiberius*, as *Tacitus* says, It was a great honor to be known to *Sejanus* his *Door-keepers*. It will therefore be a *wisemans* part, by all becoming ways, to endear the *Servants* of the *Prince*, whatever their condition be.

CHAP.

CHAP. 14.

Four kindes of Noble Courtiers ; how to be handled , and made use of ; how warily we ought to deal with inconstant Princes.

From the *Princes Servants*, we come to the *Nobles of the Court*, which are of sundry kindes : There are some illustrious for their birth, but destitute of the *Princes favor*; others in favor with the *Prince*, but not laden with honors ; a third sort, that have honors and offices, far exceeding their Interest and Favor ; and lastly, Those who flourish both in Favor, and great Employments. The friendship of the first of these, will perhaps avail our Courtier very little, who are nevertheless to be honored and respected, according to their quality ; least, though they cannot hurt you themselves, by their friends and followers, they should do it : For in such Trains of dependancies and followers, great Families are often very powerful, either by reason of old benefits, or reverence to their greatness ; or lastly, (since *Princes mindes* are mutable) out of respect to the Fortune and Favor these great men may yet chance to come into ; with this, or the succeeding Prince.

Archelaus, King of Cappadocia, to his great
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disadvantage, did neglect to Honor and Court *Tiberius*, when he came to Rhodes; for *Tiberius* afterwards meditating revenge, but pretending another cause, called him to Rome, where he perished miserably: Which respect nevertheless the *Historian* says, He omitted not out of pride, but for that he was warned by some of Augustus his Favorites, That whilst *Cajus Caesar* flourished, and was sent into the East, the Friendship of *Tiberius* seemed unsafe. We must look therefore upon these great men of Fortune, though not able to deserve well of us, yet powerful enough to hurt us: And though they be unacceptable and suspected by the Prince, we must yet reverence them, to avoid the blame of others, and their enmity.

If it chance, that the Prince will oppose you to one of these great ones, as it is usual with Princes to do; as you must not refuse the task, so you must with great art, dexterity, and choice of occasions, undertake it; taking care, that you may both satisfy the Prince, and justify your endeavors to other men: It is an enterprize full of danger, but if at the Princes instance, it be taken in hand, it is the way to rise.

Yet after you are once engaged in one of these Brigues, there are the choice of two ways to be taken, according to the nature of the Prince you act for, the persons you have

to do with, and the times you are in: Some men aſt all theſe things in their own name ſo boldly, and with ſo high a hand, That all kinde of men, except thoſe that are great indeed, ſtrike eaſily ſail unto them, for fear of offending the Prince; who approves (as they believe) all theſe men ſay or do. There are others yet, that take another courſe more ſafe and ſweet, by continually waiting upon the Prince, their intereſt, in whom they will make no ſhew of, but upon the beſt opportunities; neither will they take any occaſion for theſe contentions, but ſuch as with great choice they have ſeleſted, as both likely to ſucceed; and having took effect, to redound much to the advantage of the Prince and Publike.

For you muſt take great heed you undertake nothing you cannot go through with; for beſides that, the common people judge of all things by the event, believing ſtill, that Juſtice and Prudence, are on the ſide that Fortune is; by ill ſucceſſes, you will ſoon di- miniſh the eſteem and favor, you have with the Prince. For he to take away the diſ- grace received, and by reaſon, That he fears either to be deſpiſed of his Subjects, or con- temned by his Enemies, whom he hath oppo- ſed in vain, will be compelled to remove his favor from, and abandon you.

Beware, that when I ſpeak of your con-
D 2 tention

tention with these great persons, that you understand not, that I wish you to intermeddle, when you see it cannot be done without tumult, or that you should provoke them with contumelies and reproaches, for that becomes onely a base soul, whose judgement is corrupted by Fortune: The end of which kinde of men is seldom happy; as is to be observed in *Piso*, whom *Tiberius* sent into *Syria*, to cross the hopes and designs of *Germanicus*; against whom, he carried himself so insolent y, that when Prince *Germanicus* was dead, *Cesar* was compelled to sacrifice and abandon *Piso* to the publike hate.

When I advise you to oppose these great men, it is in cases onely, wherein they are to do something that is unjust, or against the Publike good, or Religion, or that is prejudicial to the Government of the Army, or the Treasures of the Kingdom: In which occasions, you must so comport your self with Prudence and Modesty, that all others that are concerned, and all honest men may perceive, that what you do proceeds not out of any private enmity, but onely from your zeal to the Publike good. If you demand an example to imitate, behold Cardinal *Ximenes*, chosen by *Isabella*, Queen of *Castile*, on purpose to tug with those *Grandeess*, that were not so subject to the Kings pleasure, as they are now: Of a *Franciscan Frier*, he was

was first made the Queens Confessor, afterwards by the advice of Cardinal Mendoza, Archbishop of Toledo, and Inquisitor General of Spain; which Offices he bore with great authority, being there during the whole Reign of *Isabella*, and *Ferdinand*, and was even to the time of *Charls* the Fifth, the sole Arbiter and Moderator of all Affairs; ever contending with the great ones, but so discreetly, That he always held both the Prince and people fast unto him.

It is reported that he was poisoned, and he himself suspected it, but the fact could never be proved. Wherefore it is better to attribute so late a death as his (for he was very old) to age and nature; and not without reason, since he preserved his fortune and authority (both which he owed principally to his own industry) entire unto his end. *Chico Simoneta* had not so good success, who whilst *Francis Sfortia* ruled in Milan, was called to the helm of business, and afterwards chosen by yong *Galeacius* Mother, by reason of his known fidelity, and experience in Publike Affairs, to contend with his Masters Brethren. He to preserve the Dukedom for *Galeacius*, banished *Galeacius* Brothers, and *Robert de St. Severin* out of Milan, with how much envy you may imagine: Yet see how wickedly he was afterwards deserted, for the Widow,

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Galeacius his Mother, reconciling her self with her *adversaries*, sacrificed *Simonea* to their new friendship; by whom being cast into prison, and there stayed alive, he died miserably. Learn hence, how warily we must trust *Princes*, of whose steadiness we are not assured; for often upon a light occasion, they are wont to prostitute their *Servants* to the will of their *Enemies*.

CHAP. 15.

The three other kinds of Noble Courtiers; how they are to be dealt with.

THERE are a second kinde of Noble Courtiers (as I said before) who are in favour with the Prince, and yet not very eminent in any dignity or employment. These though they can contribute nothing else unto us, may make our way unto the King, seasonable and easie, besides they may be useful in calling to minde our deserts, or if occasion require, in excusing our errors; protecting us also from the calumny and detractions of our *Enemies*; by which means, if they be really our *Friends*, they may serve us highly; as on the contrary side, if they be our foes, they may prejudice us exceedingly: Wherefore

fore we must seek the friendship of these men, by all means, that are not unworthy our condition; and we must consider, that they seldom stay any long time about a Prince, unexalted to honor: Nay, suppose that for some reason or other, they be not advanced, yet by their help and commendations, they do advance their friends, and lift them up above others, though either equal or superior to them in desert.

The third sort of Nobles, are those who are in great Offices of Authority, and have a great share in publick business, and yet have little interest in the Princes favor. And these kinde of men are chiefly found about such Princes, who live quietly, attending to their pleasures, mindless of Publick business, which they commit wholly to one or two of their tryed Servants, abhorring the trouble that is attending it themselves. In such a Court as this, we must rather seek the Favor of these Ministers, then of the Prince himself; who since he trusts them with the administration of his Affairs, leaves also the choice of his Officers to these men, being himself unfit to chuse men for duties, which he knows nothing what belongs unto.

There are other Princes more jealous of their Majesty, and sparing in their Power; who though they intrust one or two with their Affairs, do seldom or never admit

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those men to their *Presence* or *Conversation*, but when they are to treat of *weighty business*; and do not leave the *disposal* of places to them, for fear that by the multitude of *Creatures* and *Dependants*, their power should swell to that height, that it cannot be abated, if they *transgress*. Wary *Princes* are wont to keep their *Ministers* in aw, and make them believe, That they can in a moment cast them from all their *Authority*, and divest them of all that power, that with the *services* and *labors* of many years, they have been *acquiring* towards such persons as these; whose power is thus circumscribed, you will have a *hard task*, how to *demean* your self. Their *friendship* can *avail* you little, nay perhaps if the *Prince* observe it, it will do you *hurt*. Again, if they *stand in your light*, you will hardly come to the *management* of *Affairs*, and yet you must of necessity run the hazard of *clashing* oftentimes with them. Wherefore, a most *circumspect gentleness* of *Nature* will here be needful, for you must render them all the *duties* of *respect*, and as occasion presents it self (yet warily) express the *inward devotion* of your minde unto them: But in the mean while, without openly *seeking* to, or *relying upon* the *Patronage* of any other, you must your self, work out your way unto the *Princes person*, and his *favor*.

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There remains now unspeke of onely the last kinde of *Noblemen*, who are in short, *The Favorites*, as being both highly in the *Princes Favor*, and great in the administration of *Affairs*: Which kinde of men, are to be honored with a respect almost equal to the *Prince himself*. Their *wills* and *inclinations* are to be pryed into, as being more necessary to be known and executed, then the *Princes* own. Here you see, what you may expect, or hope for, from the *Authority* and *Patronage* of the *Peers*, and *Grandees* of the *Court*; and how you may use each of them in his several degree and kinde.

Truly we must carefully take heed, that we ask nothing of either the *Prince*, or any of all these that is impossible, or cannot be effected without great absurdity; For nothing is more troublesome to humane nature, then not to be able to fulfil the requests of those we love; and surely, the friendliest and gentlest dispositions that are, will be offended with an uncivil and unreasonable suit. Know moreover, that he from whom you have received such a repulse, is not pleased with seeing you again, for fear lest with the impudence of a like request, you should make him ashamed; and also, lest he should seem to want *Authority* or means to perform what you desire. But you must note by the way, that access unto the great ones, is not sudden-

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ly obtained, we must by degrees also gain *that*; and to this end, *all* that have any interest in them, whether they be *Strangers* or *Domesticks*, and the *Dependants* of these (according to their usefulness) are to be won unto you.

CHAP. 16.

The meaner sort of Courtiers, how they are to be handled; as also such as are enemies to us, for the sake of others, to whom we relate.

THere are yet in Courts below these great *Tones*, others of a lower stage; some of which are our *bettors*, others our *equals*, and some perhaps our *inferiors*; all which, since we are to make use of, we will divide into two kinds: The first, of those that may help and advantage us; the second, of those that are likely, or able to hurt us. The interest and power of both of them, is diligently to be weighed, to the end, we may gather what help or impediment we are to expect from them. We must consider also, their friendships and alliances, to the end, that if necessity press us to seek their votes for the promotion

promotion of our designs, if they themselves are through envy or any such respect, backward oraverse unto us, we may work upon them by their friends and dependants: But we must be sure to take heed, that we do not then begin to seek their friendship, when we have apparent need of them, or their assistance; we ought to have it prepared long before, and assured unto us by the pledges of a long professed kindness, and good will. Let this suffice for the first sort, (to wit, of those that may help us) for every mans industry will prompt him, *How to insinuate with such, as he findes may be useful unto him.*

Of the second sort (to wit) those that may hurt us, there are three kindes; either those that are our enemies, or those that envy us, or lastly, those that are our competitors. Those I call enemies that hate us for our own, or our friends sake; but this latter kinde of hatred, is not for the most part so inveterate and sharp as the first; and it may be mitigated much by our civilities and professing, That we can love our friends, notwithstanding our relations to their enemies: Yet the friendships of the Court are for the most part factious and cruel; compelling us to break off all friendship and familiarities that may bring us into suspicion: For which reason, many publicly pretending a friendship to

one, have notwithstanding complied underhand, and kept fair quarter with the adverse party ; not out of design to betray their friend, but to the end, if he should chance to fall, they may finde a refuge and support. And truly, this care of our preservation may be sometimes *blameless*, but all kinde of treachery is unworthy an *honest man*.

This kinde of *Prudence* hath not onely been practised in the Brigues of the Court, but in Kingdomes also, and that very fortunately. *Syenneses*, President of *Tharsus*, when the War broke out between *Cyrus* and *Artaxerxes*, fearing to resist *Cyrus*, took his part in person, and sent his son to *Artaxerxes*, to the end, that if *Cyrus* were vanquished he might be a refuge to his Father. *Barcus Durus* escaping out of the hands of the *Saracens*, where he was prisoner ; seeing *Phocas* created Emperor against *Basilius*, applied himself to gain the friendship of *Phocas*, hitherto his enemy, and followed him ; but caused his son, with a contrived flight, to take part with *Basilius*, to the end, that if *Phocas* were vanquished, he might intercede for his Father, as it afterwards fell out. *Solon* made a law, That in case of a civil discord in the Commonwealth, none should be permitted to stand neuter ; not intending, I believe, that friends taking several sides, should break off their private friendships,

ships, but rather hoping that friends being severally engaged, could not but labor for the *Publike* peace, by so much the more eagerly, and with more success.

After this manner in Court, a man though of a different faction, may yet discreetly, and without prejudice to integrity, retain his friendship with a man of another party; to the end, That he may both have a retreat in the change of Fortune, and that if their animosities should begin to assuage, he may be a fit instrument of reconciliation between the factions: Which is the safest and most commendable way amongst the strifes and discords of great men; and the means of gaining at last the favor of both the contending parties.

CHAP. 17.

How we are to treat with those Enemies that hate us for our own sakes; also concerning threats and injuries.

Those who hate us for our own sakes, do so either, because we have offended them, or else (as it is frequent from great men towards their inferiors) because they have injured us; and the Italian Proverb says, *He that*

that offends, never forgives. It is a custom amongst mindes, puffed up with a prosperous Fortune, to hate those themselves have wronged. The injuries that these kinde of men do us, are best remedied in our seeming not to understand them : But if it chance, that the greatness of the wrong, do wrest out of us some testimony of our sense of the injury received, we must quickly after our grief is over, seem to have lost the memory of all; otherwise, if they see us still impatiently suffer it, fearing our revenge, they will seek to prevent us with a greater mischief.

Cheifly we must beware of threats, if that we not ready, and sure to execute them; for threats do both warn our adversary to beware, and provoke his hatred to double our injuries; affording us nothing but shame, in seeming to breathe revenge, but to be destitute of power. I know this kinde of moderation will not be approved by all kinde of men, especially such as are greedy after vengeance; who think no injury is to be passed over without resentment, not onely by reason of the sweetness that is found in revenge; but also, because they say by suffering one injury, you invite another; wherefore we must persecute those that offend us with an immortal hate : But these men whilst they desire to render themselves formidable, do effect nothing else but make all men flie their
their

their Company. For since we mortals are Creatures prone to falls, and slips, and are carried away sometimes with affection, and at other times with passion; and in consideration, every one for fear of offending, will shie from these kinde of malignant, rash, and revengeful persons; and as wilde beasts, leave them to their own solitude. Since, if any one offends one of them, he must expect all that rage and malice can afford at his hands; Lastly, if any one provoke one of the malicious Hot-spurs, he expecting a severe resentment, and fearing a home revenge, will strive to be aforehand with him.

For this Reason therefore, for the avoiding all these evils, I think the contrary way is to be chosen, and gentleness to be preferred; which truly, in the greatest injuries is not hard to be personated, when we consider the reasons and consequences of a passionate resentment, and the condition of the persons from whom we receive them. In lighter injuries, that we see arise rather out of passion, then malice or design, we ought to be so little offended with them, that it may not be perceived we are sensible of them. If the injury is great and foul, we must not show our selves wholly careless of our esteem and reputation; yet without seeming too implacable towards them that provoked us, as they may have reason to think there is no hope of
a re-

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a reconcilment, or place for pardon upon any reasonable satisfaction left them. And therefore it will be pertinent in this case to complain unto his friends that hath injured us, of our wrongs, and to make them judge of our difference.

Injuries that are offered in a petulant insulting humor, I think ought to be presently vindicated, not so much out of a desire of revenge, as for the chastisement of him that did them; and to teach him how to demean himself more modestly hereafter, as well towards others, as our selves. But these injuries also are not to be prosecuted with an inveterate hatred, nay, we ought to declare, that the necessity of complaint, and seeking revenge is put upon us; and that we are ready to be friends after a satisfaction given vs, that is any way compatible with the injury we received. And if so be they give any secret testimonies of regret, or seek in the least maner unto us, we must return into favor with them, and by way of amends, let this suffice instead of a submission, That they profess they cannot want your friendship.

CHAP.

CHAP. 18.

The injuries of the more and less powerful, how to be avoided, and handled; the several artifices of reconciliation.

BEcause these kindes of injuries are done, for the most part, by those that are much more powerful then our selves, and who have some way or other, great advantage of us: The first way to avoid them, is to treat these kinde of men *respectively*, and to avoid all freedoms as much as may be with them: Or if they be very cross and unruly, to flie their conversation altogether. This saying of Martial is in this case very notable.

Wou'dst thou avoid what may displease?

Or seek'st thou for content and ease?

With no man be thou ever free;

As joyes, so griefs will fewer be.

The second way will be, as I said more then once before, to seem *unsensible* of the wrong; for it is neither *safe* nor *prudent* for us, to strive too much with one that is too powerful for us; and the inequality of our forces, will be a just pretence to excuse our *dissimulation*. I know there are some that are perswaded, That if we can but fright
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our adversaries, they would soon seek unto us, and desire to be reconciled; and I do not deny, that there are some *slie dispositions* that will descend to do so; but believe me, it is always a dangerous, unsound, and faint reconciliation: And these will seldom or never omit (if an occasion of injury present it self) to give way to their disposition; which is by so much the more revengeful, by how much their dissembling was the tamer; besides, a private enemy is harder to be taken heed of, then one that is *publikely* so. It is better to have such as these, our *professed enemies*, then out of fear, our reconciled friends; yet I mean, those who are not greater then our selves, nor whose friendship being lost, can hurt us notably.

For if we have to do with one that is much superior to us, and whose enmities will stand in our light, it is better to have a *fained friendship*, then open enmity with him; though he offer us the wrong, yet we must endeavor by the mediation of friends to appease him, as if we had done the injury. To discern who is most able and likely to prejudice us, we must consider not onely their power, but also the nature of their malice towards us; for some have a desire of revenge, like a handmaid, always waiting upon their hate; others a fear, lest that having got what we aspire unto, we should be more

more able to hurt them. Though the sting of this revenge is very sharp, yet the fear I mentioned, is the most violent and frequent cause of our Court oppressions, and far the most unavoidable. The first may be mitigated with the satisfaction of a continued duty and respect; but you shall hardly ever persuade fear, to put on the confidence of friendship, and good will again; yet we must seek by all means possible to effect it: and occasion will better instruct us how to do it, than any rule can.

Agessilaus desiring to become friends with those that he had offended, did put them into great offices and employments, which whilst they ill administered, bringing envy (as is usual) upon them; being accused, they were compelled to have recourse unto the Prince; who delivering them from the danger and infamy, won them by the benefit, to be afterwards sincerely and heartily his friends. It is an ordinary thing in Courts to supplant one secretly, to the end, that being supported by your favor, he may become your Creature. It is no less frequent as *Eutrapelus* craftily practised in *Horace*, to lend those men money for to feed their lusts and vanities, whom we desire to ruine. So it proves, that for the most part, they who applaud us in our pleasures, our humors, and expences, and exhort us to undertake things that

that are unreasonable, and above our strength, do seek our destruction.

But let us now return unto the ways of renewing our friendships with our Enemies. Amongst all which, it is none of the worst to help both with your Counsel and Assistance, the desires and endeavors of your Enemy, in such things as you see by succeeding will nothing hinder, nor prejudice you; to the end, he may seem to owe you his love, for your benefits. In this manner Cardinal *Ascanius Sforza* observing, That in vain he opposed himself to the practises of *Julian* the Cardinal, who labored to advance *John*, the Nephew of *Alexander* the Sixt, to that dignity; did so eagerly move in the business for *John*, that it succeeding, he got the start of *Julian* in his friendship. If the stubbornness of our Enemy be such, as that all our endeavors for a reconciliation are fruitless; we must at last look out, if there be any body else that he hates or fears more then he doth us, and let us sain this man (if the circumstances will bear it) to be a competitor to us, and him; to the end, That his hate towards the other prevailing, may induce him either to favor, or less oppose us in our designs.

An artifice not much unlike to this, was that which *Gerlachus* Archbishop and Elector of *Mentz* used, when he intended to create *Adolphus* of *Nassau*, his Kinsman,
Emperor:

Emperor : He knew that those *Princes* that stood for the *Empire*, (for which a *Governor* was now a chusing) were divided amongst themselves ; which *discords* and *façtions*, he to make use of, dealt thus with the *Electors* severally apart. . He tells *Wenceslaus* King of *Bohemia*, That the *Votes* of the *Electors*, for the most part, would favor *Albert*, Duke of *Austria*, *Wenceslaus* his Enemy : But if he were certain of *Wenceslaus* his concurrence, he was ready to hinder it. Having thus won *Wenceslaus*, he sets upon the Duke of *Saxony*, and tells him, That his Enemy *Brunswick* was like to carry it ; and then assures the *Palatine*, That *Wenceslaus* (at that time hated by him) unless prevented, was like to defeat them all. So promising to oppose every mans Enemies, he circumvented them all ; making by that means, his Kinsman Emperor, who if he had been first propounded, had without doubt been rejected by the common consent of all.

CHAP. 19.

Of Envy, how it is to be overcome.

NOW I must say something of *Envy*, which is so great an evil, that we have need of a strange felicity, and fortitude to over-

overcome it; which is not to be satiated with any thing, but the participation of that which it envies in another; for every one eager after its own advantage, desires to toyl in nothing but that, whence if not, the whole, at least a great share of the honor, and emolument will redound unto himself. Yet although, I confess, it be very hard, yet this envy is nevertheless with industry and prudence, to be mastered; and that not onely by this means alone, of sharing with them, that very thing we seek for: For sometimes it will suffice to perswade them that envy us, That the thing they desire, if it chance to light upon us, will turn much to their honor and profit. To which end, we must court them with friendship and familiarity; and though their envy to us be very palpable, yet must we express on our parts great Inclinations and Affections towards them; professing, That we wish nothing more, then that their desires should succeed, and that we desire this very thing that we now pursue, for no other end so much, as that we may become capable to serve our friends, and principally themselves. In short, we must act our part so, as from the augmentation of our fortune, they may conceive hope of advancement to their own.

By those that desire to be free from envy, all pride, over-sumptuous maner of living, unseasonable

seasonable feasts, and boasting, is sedulously to be avoided; especially, by those who have risen from a mean condition; unless the pleasure of the Prince, or the dignity of their Office, require it otherwise; for then a becoming magnificence, will not be unfit, provided, That in these expences, he lets the world see, he doth rather comply with the pleasure of the Prince, then follow his own inclination. With this kinde of modesty and prudence, the beginnings of Cardinal Ximenes were very fortunate, and notable; for he was born of so mean a parentage, that it was doubtful, whether he were a Gentleman, or no; although his prosperous fortune found those afterwards, that would undertake to prove his Nobility. This Ximenes whilst the world went hard with him, became in his youth a Frier, whence soon after for his singular endowments, he was by the commendation of Cardinal Mendoza, made Confessor to Isabella, Queen of Castile, and not long after Archbishop of Toledo, (as I said once before) which Archbishoprick upon Medoxa's death, Queen Isabella having obtained of the Pope for Ximenes; he finding himself too weak for the envy it would draw upon him, refused to accept it; and was so stiff in his refusal, That he scarce suffered himself to be won to the acceptance of it, by all the Nobles of the Court, who one by one,

at

at the *Queens* direction, prest him to imbrace it: And having accepted of it, he was fain to be so intreated over again, before he could be perswaded to live in a condition and *splendor* equal to his *dignity*; nay, after that, he was personally so observant of his former maner of life, in this great fortune, that no way else, but by the *Popes* expresse command, could he be induced to change it.

This *modesty* succeeded so well with him, that hereby he appeased and avoided that great *envy*, which must otherwise of necessity have oppressed him, being the possessor of a *dignity* gaped after, by all the *Grandees* of *Spain*, and of *Revenue*, scarce inferior to those of the *Crown*.

But yet as this maner of proceeding is in the *East* of our fortunes, an antidote against *envy*, so it little avails those who have once already carried themselves insolently and proudly; for the moderation of these men, is still looked upon as counterfeit: Of which thing, the *Constantinopolitan History* affords us an example in a *Metropolitan*, called *Constantine*; who being banished from the Courts, both of *Isacius Angelius*, and *Alexius*, the Emperors, returned afterwards with the Empress *Euphrosine*; pretending a great aversion from *business*, and a *Courtiers* life, to the end, he might be the more credited, and sought unto the more eagerly, he took orders

orders upon him : In short, he carried his business so craftily, That the *Emperor* himself causing him to be absolved from the oath of *Priesthood*, called him to *Court* ; and trusted him with the management of his greatest affairs : Who presently, not content with his own advancement , introduced his two *Brothers* to wait upon the *Emperor* ; and as it were, to stand *Centinels* for him, if at any time his business called him away : But because his former prosperity had discovered the insolence of his nature , every body feared him still, although he now made show of great temper and moderation, which was the cause that he was again supplanted and removed from *Court*, without ever being restored more.

CHAP. 20.

Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the remedies of it.

THe same remedies that are good against *Envy* , prevail also against *Emulation*, which hath less malignity in it truly, then *Envy* hath ; but more of *Ambition*, and the treachery of self-concernments. But these *Competitors* of ours, are to be stroked with a
E certain

a certain *ſpecious reſpect*, and *ceremonious veneration*, which will powerfully divert theſe kinde of humors; eſpecially, if we feed their hopes with higher things then thoſe we aim at, and ſeem to contribute our Votes and aſſiſtance to them; on the other ſide, vilifying that which we ſeek for, as below them to ſtoop unto, and fitter for our ſelves; whole merits as they are leſs, ſo our pretences ought not to be ſo high. If we fear that they will ſmell our drift, we are to hold them in ſuſpence, and ſeem to diſcourſe the caſe with Arguments on both ſides; yet giving the greateſt weight to thoſe, which we intend ſhould divert their ambitions. But the ſureſt and beſt courſe of all, is to conceal, if it be poſſible, what we aim after, till it be out of the power of our Enemies, or Competitors to hinder us.

A too great eagernels in our pretences, is ſometime odious, even to thoſe that would if it were more modeſt, contribute their aſſiſtance to us; pulling with it beſides, other greater inconveniencies upon us, as if we ſucceed, more envy, and if we fail, a greater diſgrace: It is much more ſafe, as I ſaid even now, to hide our deſigns, and as Rowers do turn our backs upon the place we are going unto. Thoſe that look after the greateſt Commands, have taken this way; nothing hath been more uſual unto them, then after

the example *Agamemnon* in *Euripides*, to express a greater desire of rest and retirement, then of honor or imployment. And many have found this a singular remedy, to divers the wiles of those that would oppose them, and to escape the disgrace which attends those fierce pretenders; nay, they have had hereby the glory, to have it often thought, That this honor or imployment was cast upon them, meerly for their merits, and not obtained by begging or buying of voices, as it too often falls out.

Last of all, in our pretences we must take heed, that we clash with no rival, that is greater or more powerful in Friends and Dependants, then our selves. In this case we must imitate *Marcus Lepidus*, a man in *Tacitus* his opinion, of great wisdom; who being drawn, as it were, into the Senate by *Tiberius*, to stand with *Junius Blasus*, *Sejanus* his Uncle, whether of them should be chosen *Proconsul* of *Africk*, pretended presently against himself, want of health, the tender years of most of his Children, and the marriage of a Daughter, that he was to take care of; fearing doubtlesly to make *Sejanus* his Enemy, if he carried away the Province from *Blasus*. Neither must we obstinately contend with him, whom some great man is about to advance, although the Law favor us against him; for without doubt, Favor

E 2 weighs

weighs down the Law, as Tacitus instances in Germanicus and Drusus, creating Haterius Agrippa Prætor, notwithstanding the express contradiction of a Law; But let the Historian speak himself. There arose a dispute of substituting a Prætor in the place of Vipfanius Gallus lately dead; Germanicus and Drusus favored Haterius Agrippa, Germanicus his Kinsman; others on the contrary side, did contend, That the number of Children should carry it, according to the Law. Tiberius was glad to see his Sons, and the Laws of the Senate, clash together; without doubt the Law was overcome, but yet not easily, nor by many voices: By which means, when they were in their greatest vigor, they were wont to be overborn.

CHAP. 21.

How to avoid a threatening ruine, and when it is upon us; how to make the best use of it: Examples of the fall of great men.

Hitherto we have observed the principal precepts that are to be observed by our Courtier; if any want, every rational mans (for such onely we intend to instruct) Prudence and Dexterity will supply it. Now
because

because these kinde of Rules are no less necessary, for the preserving our Greatness and Fortune in the Court, then for the gaining of it; it will not be impertinent to have by us, the examples of some of those that have *fallen from their power and greatness*, to the end, we may grow wise by other mens mischances; and learn, if not to avoid a ruine, at least to arm and prepare ourselves for it: For this latter is almost as necessary as the first, since the indeavors of those that seek to escape their approaching misfortunes, are for the most part vain; whilst he that prepares himself for it long before, makes that fall, which few or none of them can avoid; that fortune hath lifted up on high, to be much more gentle and easie, then otherwise it would.

These falls happen unto us, either through our own faults, through the arts and contrivance of our Enemies, or through the perverseness of the Princes nature, or perhaps his death. Since the lives of all men are obnoxious to faults, and full of errors, and failings, it is so especially with those that are on high, who by reason of their greatness, are out of the lists of reprehension; all that are about them, being compelled to approve of whatever they do, be it well or ill. Amongst all which faults, the foulest they are incident unto, is, A treacherous turning against
E 3 their

their Prince, who is the Author of their Dignity, and Power : A crime marked out with the blackest note of an ungrateful and faithless Soul; and a most just subject of the Princes hate and indignation. All men that are in Authority ought to flie the very shadow of this crime, and to the end of taking all ground of suspicion from the Prince, to decline those honors and places, that are opportune for such attempts.

Paterculus esteems *Sejanus* to have been one of the wisest Courtiers that ever was; and truly it is likely, That he that flourished so long in the favor of a Prince, so subtil, and diffident, as *Tiberius* was, did comport himself with great modesty and wariness. He was (saith our Author) in appearance given to ease, assuming nothing to himself, and by that means obtaining all things; Crouching still willingly beneath the opinion of other men, and striving to come behinde them in repute; His countenance and his life, was calm and quiet, although his minde was restless, and ever a wake; yet ambition at last transported this provident and wary man so far, as to aspire to the Empire. To which end, *Drusus* being dead, he married *Livia* his Widow, that so being linked into the House of the *Cæsars*, he might more easily compass his desire : And although he perceived out of *Tiberius* his tergiversations, when he demanded his consent

consent in the case, that it had drawn a suspicion upon him; yet did he not change his minde; but what he had failed of this way, he sought to compass another.

He knew that *Tiberius* was grown weary of the City, whereupon he presently spurs him on, and perswades him to retire to *Caprea*; read *Tacitus*, *Annal.* 4. who says, That lest he should either infringe his Power, or weaken his Authority, by debarring the multitude from the Court, or minister matter of slander, and suspicion by entertaining them, he took this course: He perswaded *Tiberius* to go live in some pleasant place, far from *Rome*; foreseeing many conveniencies in it. First, There could be no access to the Prince, but through him; then, That the disposal of all Letters would be in his hands, since the Soldiers, by whom they were to be conveyed, would be at his devotion; and lastly, That *Cæsar* now growing old, and waxing effeminate with the privacy of the place, would easily transfer the burthen of Affairs, and Government upon him. And truly, his hopes deceived him not, for in a short time, under pretence of easing *Tiberius* his age, he drew all the power of the Empire into his own hands.

Yet at last, the event showed, That this way of *Sejanus*, was both perilous and tedious; to mention which more accurately, seems worth my labor here, to the end,

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That both *Courtiers* may be more wary in governing their *Fortune*, and *Princes* more cautious in exalting their *Minions*. *Tiberius* did either love or suffer patiently *Sejanus*, as long as he found *his help* useful to the oppression of *Agrippina*, and her *Children*, *Nero*, and *Drusus*; to which kinde of imployments, *Sejanus* shewed himself very ready, knowing, That thereby he should not only win the favor of the *Prince*, but also establish his own power and hopes; there being none left of *Cæsars* house now but two youths, whose tender age, if they should come to the *Government*, must needs leave the *Authority*, and ordering of *Affairs*, to him; until he saw his opportunity of usurping the *Empire* it self.

But mark how rash and blinde ambition makes us; He did not see, that the nearer he came to the top, the more he became suspected of this jealous *Prince*; who now sought all means of lessening, rather than advancing him; that strove as much on the other side to climb still on; For though he wanted nothing, but the name of *Emperor* (which some did not stick to give him) and the *Tribunes* power (which the *Emperors* never intrusted to any) yet was he not content, but daily endeavoured to augment his *Authority*. By which course, as he rendered himself venerable to all others, so he made

made himself formidable to Tiberius; For when he saw that *Sejanus* had not onely won the *Pretorian Guards*, but also very many of the *Senators*, and principal *Families* of *Rome*, by either *benefits*, or *hopes*, or *fears*, unto himself; and likewise, That his *secrecies* were by his own *servants* told unto *Sejanus*, and not *Sejanus* his to him again; he determined his *destruction*, as one that was become his *rival*: But before he went about it, he thought fit to sound the inclinations of those about him, to the end, That he might know how to chuse out some that would like of his design.

Lest that *Sejanus* should smell out any change in *Cæsars* affection towards him, he makes him *Consul*, and calls him both present and absent in his *Letters* to the *Senate*, and the *People*, His friend and companion of his labors. Lastly, he feigns himself sick, to discover thereby, the affections both of *Sejanus*, and several others. Sometimes he writes to the *Senate* of his recovering condition, and that he would shortly come to *Town*; sometimes praising, sometimes blaming *Sejanus*; sometimes receiving those that came recommended by him, and at other times refusing others; that thus he might keep him suspended between hope and fear, who, whether trusting to his favor with the *Prince*, or for fear of losing of his

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his hopes, resolved to attempt nothing by force ; hoping, that the disgusts of the Prince, if there were any, would wear out with time. In this interim, others who had hitherto fawned upon *Sejanus* his fortune, not upon himself, seeing *Tiberius* stagger, began to carry themselves more warily, and the devotion of many towards *Sejanus*, grew cold.

Tiberius having discovered long ago the pride and insolency of *Sejanus*, and fearing withal, lest provoked by contempt, he should run some desperate course, caused it to be given out, That he intended to confer the *Tribunical Power* upon *Sejanus* ; and presently after, Commands him to be laid in prison, writing Letters, to that end to the Senate, which were carried by *Macro*, Captain of the Guards : Who coming to Rome, first communicated the Princes pleasure to *Memmius Regulus*, then Consul (for the other Consul was more addicted to *Sejanus*) and then to *Gracinus Laco*, Captain of the Watch, it being not yet break of day. Thence going to the Senate-house, he met *Sejanus*, who startled to see him, demanded if he had brought him any Letters from *Tiberius*, he whispered in his ear, That he should anone be saluted Tribune ; whereupon, he entring the Senate-house, not without an inward joy, *Macro* commanded the

Pretorian

Pretorian Guards to go home, showing them to that end, a Warrant from the *Emperor*, in which also, he promised them a *Large*s. The *Pretorian Soldiers* being departed, and *Laco's* Company placed there in their room, *Macro* enters the *Senate*, and delivers his Letters; immediately going forth, without expecting the reading of them, to bid *Laco* stand well upon his Guard, lest *Sejanus* raising a tumult in the *Senate*, should break away; and went thence himself to the *Pretorian Guards* to hinder them, lest they should attempt any thing.

The Letters that were then a reading, were spun out into a great length, to the end, That *Macro* might have time enough to order his business; and truly they were interwoven with a wonderful contrivance. In the beginning there was no mention of business, nor any thing concerning *Sejanus*; a little after he was touched upon, as they say, with a gentle hand; then some other things interlaced, there followed a more open, but that also a slight accusation against him: At last, after sundry excursions about the Affairs of the Commonwealth, two of *Sejanus* his favorites were named, and the *Senate* commanded to proceed against them; and withal, that *Sejanus* himself should be secured. All mention of his death being purposely left out, to the end, That hope might

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might be left to the accused, of clearing himself of those *crimes*, and those but *light ones*, that were there objected against him.

The *Letters* being read, many that had waited upon him into the *Senate*, seeing things of another nature in hand, then making *Sejanus Tribune*, rose up and compassed him in, lest he should escape; which it is believed, that he would at least have attempted to do, if in the beginning, the *Emperors Letters* had thundered any thing sharply against him. But he then despising those *slight touches*, sate still in his place; and being called upon, either two or three times, by the *Consul Memmius* to rise up, with much ado he obeyed at last, as being accustomed to give, and not receive commands. When he was risen, *Laco* followed him close at the heels, and after him came *Regulus*, accompanied with other *Senators*, who led him from the *Senate* to the prison; and thence, soon after, to execution at the *Scala Gemonia*, where he was put to death.

Behold here the ruine of a great *Courrier*, and a *Favorite*, who for craft and power had scarce ever his equal. The contrivance of whose fall, though it may seem due to *Tiberius his Prudence*, yet it is rather to be attributed to his own greatness and prosperity, which ruined it self with its own weight, so evidently, That all those sleights and strata-
gems

gems of Tiberius, were not very needful; as may be gathered out of the example of *Perennius*, who aspiring to the same height that *Sejanus* did, and by the same arts, was subverted by *Commodus*, a Prince of a judgement far inferior to *Tiberius*. It may well be, that many will not be moved with these examples, because they will seem to be *wiser then others*, and to know something more then *these did*, whose misfortunes are here recounted. I will not move them to passion, with telling them what I think; although truly, I will not deny, but in those latter ages, there have been some, whose projects succeeded less unhappily, as *Boylas*, whose story we read in the *History of Constantinople*; who being caught in a conspiracy against *Constantinus Monomachus*, then Emperor, did not undergo so heavy a punishment; as for such crimes, are wont to be inflicted, the reason being, because he had the luck to transgress against a *milde and gentle Prince*.

It will not be amiss to recite the story briefly here, to the end, you may see how the *secretest Counsels*, and undiscoverably by the eyes of man, are oftentimes discovered by the *divine Providence*, after an unlookt for manner; not being able to escape punishment, by whatsoever *Caution* they are managed. No mortal man would have believed, that
this

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this *Boylas* should have any inclination to, or could have any ground for, so great a villany. The greatness of the favors, which were heaped upon him, had possessed the good Prince with a great hope and opinion of his singular fidelity, who seemed also by nature unapt for great undertakings: He was not onely of very mean birth, but also stammered so much, as he could hardly be understood; which stuttering, since he saw it pleasing to the Emperor, he did afterwards affect on purpose: With this assentation and flattery, he so insinuated himself into the Princes familiarity, That the Bed-chamber and Cabinet of *Constantine*, were always opened unto him: At last being enriched by the Prince, he was chosen into the number of the Senators, and begins to cast his thoughts higher; wherein he went so far, that he determined by the murther of the Prince, to make his own way to the Scepter. This design he first opened to those he knew surely hated the Emperor, promising mountains to such as approved it, and offered him their assistance; and praising greatly those that disliked it, and refused it out of their affection and loyalty towards the Prince; as whose spie, he would seem to propound such things, to discover the inclinations of his subjects.

By which means he was undecryed by all,

all, but such, whose fellowship in the Treason, make him secure of them; and had at last, effected that abominable act, if at the very time, when he had the Weapon in his hand, which he had prepared for the Emperors Throat; one of the Conspirators, touched with a sudden remorse of Conscience, had not seasonably disclosed, and discreetly prevented it. The Emperor took the injury so patiently, That having condemned some of the Conspirators to die, he was satisfied in inflicting banishment onely, on the Author of the Treason.

It were too long to recount all those here, who having undertaken such Treasons, were caught in them, or else, though innocent, were falsely believed to be guilty of some such design, and made shipwrack in Court. But contenting our selves with what we have already said, this onely is to be added, That all Pride, whether through Ambition, Bragging, Reproaches, Detraction, Ostentation, or other pompous maner of living, it displease the Prince, is the high roade to ruine.

CHAP. 22.

Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Perfidy, noted with examples.

THis Boasting and recounting of services past, destroyed *Philotas* and *Clytas* in the Court of the Great *Alexander*; and *Craterus* himself had like to have been overborn with those winds: Certainly, he had been much more acceptable to the Prince, if he had contained himself within the bounds of a generous modesty; so *Cajus Silius* with *Tiberius*; *Antonius Primus* with *Vespasian*; and *Sillas* with King *Agrippa*; by boasting of their services, deprived themselves of all the fruit of them: As *Tacitus* witnesses of the two first, *Annal.* 4. and *Hist.* 4. And *Josephus*, of the last. Princes do believe their Fortunes and Favors lost, and cast away upon these Braggadoshaws; for they will have their subjects seem to owe all they have to them, and their bounty; not to their own vertue, and merits.

The liberty of reprehending the actions of Princes, or inveighing against others in their presence, is to be carefully avoided, as bordering upon Arrogance, and Presumption. *Eumenes* complaining before *Alexander*, something

something petulantly, That *Hephæstion* should assign the Soldiers Quarters to *Musicians*, *Comedians*, and such kinde of people, incurred the displeasure of the King.

To treat with the *Prince* over familiarly, or to seem to make one self the sole *Arbiter* of his principal cares, favors of *Pride*, although it may proceed onely out of *Vanity* and *Covetousness*; as it appeareth in the example of *Zotirus*, once the favorite of *Heliogabalus*; and also of *Turinus*, who scarce worse then *Zotirus*, yet more unhappy, was commanded to be stifled to death with smoke, by *Alexander* the son of *Mamea*; the Executioner crying out, *Let him perish with smoke, who sold smoke*. He was wont to brag, That the *Prince* was governed by his advices; and so by intruding upon the *Princes* retirements, and with impertinent senceless whispers in publique, pretending to favor, was sought unto by very many; and gathered together great riches, through the bribes, and presents of those, to whom all his interest in the *Prince*, could not avail a straw.

The *Arrogance* of *Plancianus* is also worthy of memory, which being accompanied with great vanity, broke out at last into open perfidy: His arrogance was such, That he did not stick to contend with *Bassianus*, the *Emperors* Son; who was Author both
of

of his *Dignity*, and *Fortune*; and he was withal so *vain*, that as he passed through the *City*, he would not onely *interdict* all access unto him, but also would not suffer them to *behold him*; his *Ushers* going before still to *cleer the streets*, of all that they could see. Becoming a *Traitor* at last against his *Prince*, and convicted of his *Treason*, he was *Beheaded*. In *France*, during the time of *Philip le Bell*, *Enguerrandus Marigny*, daring to contest personally with *Charls de Valoy*, what misery he did pull upon himself, and his friends, may be observed in the *French Histories*.

Above all things, we must take heed, That we give not our selves in *Court*, to sowing of *strife* between *Princes*, and great men; for they becoming friends, do for the most part *sacrifice* such unto their *friendship*; of which, though the stories of all Nations are full, yet the *Bavarian History* furnishes us with one example very memorable, of *Otho Crondoserus*, who flourishing with *Rodulphus* the *Palatine* in singular favor, was the Author of great *emnities* between this *Prince* and his *Mother*, for a time; but the *Mother* afterwards reconciling herself unto her son, *Crondoserus* had his *Eyes* and *Tongue* pull'd out.

CHAP. 23.

How we must, not onely take care to preserve the Princes Favor, but also that of those in Power about him.

IT is not enough, that the Princes themselves be not averse unto us, but we must also keep our selves aright with those that are in favor with them. Germanicus at his death, gave that advice to Agrippina his Wife, of which Tacitus, Annal. 2. speaks thus. Then turning to his Wife, he intreated her by his memory, and for their Children sake, which were common to them both, That she would pull down her stomach, and submit her great heart to the rage of Fortune; lest returning to the City, she should with emulation of her greatness, stir up against her, persons more powerful then her self; Agrippina's neglect of this document, ruined her and her children. I told you before, how much Eumenes his favor was diminished with Alexander; after that, railing against Hephæstion, he carried himself irreverently towards the Prince; and discovered his spleen and envy, to him that he accused.

Wherefore, when we see any one in the Princes favor, we must carefully weigh his Authority, and compare it, as it were, in a
ballance

ballance against our own ; that we may know certainly which weighs down the other : And in the tryal of this, we are not so much to observe *outward appearances*, as the circumstances of *inward causes*. *Craterus* and *Hephestion*, for a time did flourish both of them, in *great and equal favor* with *Alexander* ; until *Alexander* himself determined the business, in calling one of them, The *Kings friend*, and the other, *Alexanders friend*.

Out of which decision, *Craterus* might have made this judgement, That since *Princes*, for the most part, are more in love with their *own wills*, then their *Authority* ; they also are held *more dear* unto them, who rather adore and worship *Alexander*, that is their *Person*, then their *Fortune* and *Kingly Dignity* : And though that afterward upon a strife that arose between *him* and *Hephestion*, when all the Court was divided into *factions*, *Alexander* seemed to incline to neither side ; but chiding them both heavily, threatened punishment, if ever they should *harp upon that string* again ; yet his maner of dealing with them, shewed rather his *singular Prudence*, to be imitated by all *Princes*, then his *equal affection* to them both. He apprehended, that this discord might produce *great tumults*, and *mischief* ; For he knew both *Craterus* his great interest

in the *Macedonians*, and how much *Hephastion* was envied for his favor to him. Therefore to diminish *Hephastions* envy, he reprehended him publikely; and to avoid giving offence to the *Macedonians*, he reproved *Craterus* in private.

Amongst those that in this tryal and examen of the *Princes* favor, between themselves and others, were out of negligence and discretion, most grossly mistaken: *Antonius Primus* ought to have the first place, who daring to contend with *Mutianus*, learnt at last, That he had better have contested with *Vespasian* himself. And in this manner, you will finde it is a thing witnessed by the examples of all Courts, To vindicate more sharply an injury against the Favorites, then against the Prince himself. Dio tells us the reason of it, when he had recounted how the same thing happened to *Sejanus*, thus, As those whom vertue and consciousness of their own deserts, hath lifted up to dignities, do not much stick upon the vain Ceremonies, and outward Circumstances of Honor: So on the contrary side, those who seek to climb by Ambition, Pride, and Vice, thereby to hide their unworthiness, and meanness, do presently take ill, and understand as a contempt, the least neglect of Ceremony, and respect towards them. Insomuch, that it is harder to preserve the friendship of these men, then of the Prince himself,

himself, for he thinks it a *glorious* and *Princely* act to forgive *injuries*: When these, lest they should seem to *remit* that which they cannot *revenge*, even to ostentation, do use their *borrowed power*, in persecuting those that have offended them.

CHAP. 24.

Pride even in the meanest persons at Court, noted with examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Princes secrets.

NEither truly hath it been *destruction* to great ones onely, to have carried themselves *insolently* and *amiss*, but also to men of the *lower stage*. *John King of Arragon*, loved *Alvarez de Luna* so much, that he trusted him with all his *Affairs*, and even his *Kingly power* it self, notwithstanding the repining of all his *Nobles*. But when he by reason of his prosperous *Fortune*, fell into that *pride* and *presumption*, That he caused a *Nobleman*, who in the *Kings name* admonished him of his *duty*, to be *precipitated* and *murthered*; he was by the *Kings command* beheaded. It is also an ordinary cause of *shipwrack* in *Court*, when any one hath rendred, either himself,

or

or the *Prince*, hateful to the *Peers*, or *People*; For, either the *Prince* is fain of his own accord, to cast such a one off, to rid himself of envy, or else others never leave, till they have overthrown him. During the Reign of *Commodus*, *Cleander* once armed the *Pretorian Guards* against the *Roman people*; which was a ground of so great tumults in *Rome*, that unless the *Emperor* had sacrificed *Cleander* to the peoples fury, he himself could not have been secure.

The same *Commodus*, had rendred himself odious to all men, by his affection to one *Anterus*; from which envy, that they might free their *Master*, some of *Commodus* his servants being very desirous, slew this *Anterus* as he was coming from *Court*. *Eutropius* who had been long dear to *Arcadius*, the *Emperor*; since, he was believed to be the Author of the *Sedition* raised by *Tribigildus*, was given up as a price of the *Peace*, by the *Prince*, to the *Enemies*.

Amongst the evils that subvert Courtiers, there are two remaining yet, as very dangerous, so very frequent; A betraying of the *Prince's secrets*, and *Conspiracy with his Enemies*. Crimes, for the most part, arising out of *perfidy*, but many times also out of *levity*, and *indiscretion* onely. And forasmuch as concerns the *secrets of Princes*, I think they do very well, who pry not into them; and who,

who, if their office exact it not at their hands, avoid the bare knowledge of them: For if you be the onely person, to whom they are imparted, and Fame (which often makes wity conjectures) chance to scatter any thing like unto them, you cannot avoid the suspicion, that the secret came out by you: And although the Prince perhaps hath imparted it to some one else, yet it may fall out so, that he hath forgot; or else, that he is more confident of the other mans silence, and so the foil remain upon you still.

Not without cause, did *Philippides* the *Comique Poet*, when he was asked by King *Lyfimachus* (to whom he was very dear) of what things he did chiefly desire to be made partaker by his Prince, answer, That he would refuse nothing that came from the Prince, his secrets onely excepted; from which he desired to be excused. Let us from the example of this man, as much as we can, and esteem it safer to be ignorant of secrets, so difficult and dangerous to be kept, then to know them. *Hiero*, Tyrant of *Syracusa*, was wont to say, That those who discover Princes secrets, do wrong both to themselves, and to those they impart them unto, by exposing them also together with themselves, to the hatred of the Prince.

CHAP. 25.

The causes, kindes, and examples of Conspiracies with the Princes Enemies.

YET their condition is, of all other, most hazardous and ticklish, who led either by avarice, ambition, or desire of providing for their own security, do conspire with the Princes enemies; whether they be either Strangers, or Domesticks. Cardinal Balais, a Taylors son, being by Lewis the Eleventh, made his Treasurer, and afterward a Bishop, at last also by the Kings intercession, and the Popes willingness, to oblige one that had been so sharp an adversary unto him, was promoted to the dignity of Cardinal: But afterwards being convicted of a Conspiracy with the Kings Enemies, he was sent to the Tower of Loches, where he dwelt twelve years, until Sixtus Quintus by great intreaties, and much ado, procured his release. For the like crime, the Cardinal of Prata underwent the like punishment, in the Reign of Francis the Fifth; and had never, perhaps, got his liberty, had he not deceived his Physicians with an opinion of the Strangury, by drinking his Urine: When the King fearing the anger of the Pope, if consumed with

F

that

that disease, a *Cardinal* should die in prison, dismiss him. *Petrus de Vineis*, a chief Counsellor of the Emperor, *Frederick* the Second, being suspected of intelligence with Pope *Alexander* the Third, the Emperors Enemy, lost his eyes.

Not onely designs of *usurping* the Empire of the East, but also private intercourse betwixt him and *Alaricus*, King of the *Goths*, are believed to have caused *Stilico's* death: Which that shameful Peace he made with the same *Alaricus*, against the will of the Senate, seems to confirm; *Lampadius* (who always disclaimed it) calling it not a Peace, but a Contract of slavery; whereby the Emperor was obliged to pay Tribute to Barbarians.

CHAP. 26.

That our Courtier must not be the Author of Hazardous Counsels; the variety of Errors, whereby the Princes favor is lost.

THe Courtier that we are all this while forming, must chiefly beware, That he never be the Author of Hazardous Counsels; for the ill success of these, is always
wont

wont to be imputed to the unfortunate adviser, and the good unto the Fortune of the Prince; not onely by the vulgar, who judge all things by the event, but also by the Prince himself; who is always glad to have some one, upon whom to derive the envy of an unluckie undertaking, and scarce ever willing that any one should share with him in the glory of a prosperous action. A good while before and after Stilico's death, the Argument of the Publique Complaint, was, his unseemly Peace with the Gothes; until at last, Olympius who had procured his ruine, seeking fame from contrary courses, broke the Truce, Alaricus in vain, pleading the injustice of the deed; But afterwards having made War for some time, still with ill success, this very man was, in the opinion of the people, esteemed, *The Author of all their evils*; And at last, being accused by the Eunuches, who were in great favor with the Emperour, he was faine to leave the Court, and flie into Dalmatia.

When either the beginning of a War, or breaking of a Peace, is treated of; the part of a wise Counsellor is to bring Arguments for both sides, and leave the Prince at liberty to make choice, of what likes him best. And if he be prest to deliver his opinion, it will be the safer course to incline to peace; unless invincible necessity, or an apparant advantage,

perswade the contrary : Which course was prudently taken by *Jovius*, the Successor of that *Olympius*, we lately mentioned.

He, though he was more inclined to War, that so himself might be more necessary to the *Emperor* ; yet after the maner of some *Statfmen*, seemed to prefer a love to Peace, having met with *Alaricus* at *Ariminum*, whither he was sent to confer with him; he sends the Conditions that *Alaricus* propounded to *Honorius* ; perswading him in other Letters apart , That he should offer the command of his Armies to *Alaricus* , to make him more reasonable in other things. The *Emperor* denying , That it was not safe for him to commit the strength of his *Empire* to a stranger, that had been hitherto his Enemy, answered , That he had rather consent to pay him *Tribute*.

When *Jovius* had read these Letters to *Alaricus* , he angry to see himself, and his friendship rejected by *Honorius*, broke off the *Treaty of Peace*, and *Jovius* returns to *Honorius* ; who being much offended with the insolence of his enemy, swore, He would never have any peace with *Alaricus* ; and gave the same Oath to all his *Courtiers* and *Commanders*. Thus *Jovius* by the same art, removed from himself, the envy of the broken truce , and endearing himself to *Alaricus*, by the testimony of his good-will, in advising

advising *Cæsar* to give him the Command of his Armies, engaged *Honorius* in a War; whereby the power and authority of *Jovius* was wonderfully established. There is in story so great variety of *those errors*, by the means of which *Courtiers* have fallen from their *Princes* favor, That no mans diligence can reckon them all up so; but when he hath recounted many, he shall finde still more behinde. Wherefore having here cull'd out some of the *principal*, we leave the rest to the *industry* and *discretion* of every observing Reader.

CHAP. 27.

Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are supplanted by others; and first, under pretence of specious employments abroad, or of calling them from their Commands, to attend upon the Kings Person.

WE have seen already, How by *his own fault*, a *Courtier* may loose the *Princes* favor; let us now show the means, whereby *his Enemies* are wont to supplant him; which are of three sorts. Either they

will endeavor to remove him from the Court, under an honorable pretence; or else they will render him suspected, and hateful to the Prince; or lastly, will by open force compel the Prince to remove him.

Of the first kinde of these three; as there are *divers ways*, so the ends are *divers*. For some are with *shows of honor*, or with the desire of *living amongst their friends*, willingly perswaded to depart the Court. Which course, during the Reign of *Manuel Comnenus*, *Styppiota* craftily used, to remove out of his way *Hagiotheodorita* that stood in his light: For there arising a Controversie between *Michael Padagogus*, and *Joseph Balsamon*, *Styppiota* perswaded the Emperor, That if *Hagiotheodorita* were made Governor of *Peloponnesus*, it would put an end to the contention of these great ones. *Hagiotheodorita* out of desire of assisting his Kinsman, undertakes the employment; not dreaming that *Styppiota* having got his rival out of the way, would by this means come to the sole management of Affairs, as indeed it fell out.

Some men also tired out with the brawls and strifes of their Enemies in Court, to provide for their own quiet, do easily imbrace any plausible employment for a pretence of their departure, As *Agrippa* did, who, *Velleius* testifies, went into *Asia*, under the colour of a
great

great imployment, onely to withdraw himself from Court, where he had private grudges and heart-burnings against Marcellus, as the report goes.

Tiberius, whilst Caius Caesar lived, retired to Rhodes, upon pretence of following his studies, and by his Mothers means (they are Suetonius his words) to hide the disgrace of it, obtained to be sent, as it were, Ambassador from Augustus. If there want a pretext, whereby he whom you desire to remove, may voluntarily seek leave to go, and esteem it for a benefit; the Prince must be perswaded to give him some charge, by reason it can be executed by none, so well as he: So also, if there be any man great and powerful in any of the Provinces abroad, and have emulators that seek to eclipse him; they must labor to call him thence to Court, as necessary to the Princes person; that so being crouded up amongst the Courtiers, his lustre may be bscured.

This art used Apelles in Polybius, when he stript Taurion of the Government of Peloponnesus. So Darius by the advice of Megabyzus, recalled Hyesteus out of Ionia; not, that he had any need of his presence, as he pretended, but to weaken his Authoriny. If these Courtiers would rest contented with removing others out of their way, for their own advancement, and proceed no further,

in comparison of many worse, these arts and practises would be something tolerable; but the most of them rest not here: In the Reign of *Constantius*, *Sylvanus*, General of the Foot (as *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us) by *Arbetio* his procurement, was sent into *France*, to chastise the *Barbarians* for the injuries they offered to the *Gauls*; whether he being once come, and growing into favor with the *Nation*, and also rich; the envy of *Arbetio* wrought at last his utter destruction with the *Emperor*.

Almost the same fortune under this very *Emperor* had *Ursicinus*, the General of the Horse: *Eusebius*, the *Eunuch*, had together with some other *Courtiers*, conspired his ruine; and by these mens means, to the end he might be far enough from *Court*, he was sent upon some expedition to the *Confines* of *Persia*; where having staid ten years, *Sabinianus* was sent to succeed him, neither in judgement nor experience, equal to the charge: Whereupon, presently a rumor being spread, That the *Persians* were preparing for a *War*, he was commanded to stay there still, though the power was already given to another. *Eusebius* contriving it so on purpose, to the end, That whatsoever good success hapned against the *Persians*, might be attributed to *Sabinianus*; and what ever fell out amiss, might be imputed

to *Ursicinus*, as the event witnessed; for *Ursicinus* cast down for another mans faults, retired and past the rest of his life in private. The Reign of this *Emperor* doth furnish us yet with another example; For *Ruffinus*, the Uncle of *Gallus*, Captain of the Guard, was sent to appease a mutiny of the Soldiers, out of no other intention, but that he might perish in the rage of the tumult: As *Clytus* did complain, That he was sent by *Alexander* against the *Sogdians*, to no other end.

CHAP. 28.

How Calumnies are used to make men suspected, or hated by the Prince.

THUS much for the first way, whereby *Courtiers* are by their *Enemies* supplanted, and stript of the *Princes* favor. Now let us come to the second, which are, The *Calumnies*, that are used to render us hated and suspected by the *Prince*: In *Calumnie*, two things are to be observed; the first is, Whether it be sufficient to deprive him of the *Princes* favor? the second is, Whether it be probable? Of the first, We must make our judgement out of the present state of things,

out of the *humor and inclination of the Prince*, and out of the *nature of the Calumny intended*. No kinde of *slander* doth subvert more great men, then that which accuses us of *conspiracy against the Princes person*, or his *Empire*, or else of *contempt or disdain* to obey; with *detraction*, and *derision* towards the *Prince*.

These *Calumnies* are rendred likely to be true, not onely by the *words and actions* of those that are *accused*, and of their *servants, friends, and kinred*, but also by *contrived Letters*, and the *disposition of the Prince*; too apt to believe the *Calumny*, or too prone to think ill of the person *accused*; especially, if he were ever suspected before. These things which are by *Calumny* converted into a *Crime*, he that is traduced, either *did*, or *said* of his own accord; or else was *ticed* into them, by the sleights of his *Enemies*, and *Competitors*: The knowledge and practise of which *Malice*, whers the wits of those who will *curiously watch their occasions*; and know dexterously how to use them.

There are some men that will put *Projects* into our heads, to the end, That if we imbrace them, they may make these very things, a subject of *Calumny* against us, and accuse us to the *Prince* of some *wicked intention*. There was a certain *Magician*, called *Santabarinus* very much beloved by
Basilus,

Basilius, Emperor of *Constantinople*, but as much hated by *Leo*, the Emperors Son; who this *Magician* desiring to overthrow, did so besiege him with counterfeited duties, and feigned respects, that at last winning upon him, he grew into credit with the yong Prince: Then having got an authority and interest in him, he takes his time, and warns *Leo*, with great art and sollicitude, That whensoever he went a Hunting with his Father, he should carry a *Poignard* under his Garments, to defend himself withal: He obeying this advice, the *Magician* goes to his Father, informing him, That his Son intended to murder him, and for a testimony, told him, That he always carried a *Dagger* hidden about him, waiting for an occasion of performing it. In short, the business came to that pass, the yong Prince was searched, and the *Poignard* found, whereupon he was cast into prison; and though he were protected by the joynt intercession of all the Court, yet he hardly escaped with his life.

Whilst *Valentinian* was Emperor, *Aëtius* accused *Earl Boniface*, who was very dear unto *Valentinian*, and Governor of *Africa*, unto *Placidia*, the Emperors Mother, of Treachery towards the Prince, and of a design he had of subjecting *Africa* to himself; perswading her withal, That he should be

be recalled quickly. At the same time he warns *Boniface* by his Letters, That he was accused at Court, and for that reason recalled; wherefore he should take heed how he returned, if he loved his own safety. *Boniface* giving credit unto him, obeyed him so far, That (resolving to oppose those that would come to reduce him) he called in *Gontarus*, King of *Valladolid*, and *Genfericus* his Son, then reigning in *Spain*, unto his aid; who upon this occasion, possessed themselves of *Mauritania*. The deceit being afterwards found out, to the end the truth might appear more plainly, they were permitted the tryal of a combat, wherein *Ætius* being vanquished, was banished the Court.

Not unlike unto this was the craft of *Samona*, beloved by *Leo*, Son to the Emperor *Basilius*. (by reason of his detection of the Treason of *Basilius*, Kinsman to the Empress *Zoa*) who resolving to ruine *Andronicus*, that was General against the *Saracens*, caused him to be warned by a friend, that he should take heed of *Hymenius*, who came to deprive him of his eyes; which was in those days a punishment usual towards great persons, whose power was overgrown, and become formidable: *Andronicus* believing this to be true, which was feigned by *Samona*, withdraws himself from *Hyme-*
tius,

rius, unto a place of strength, which he seized upon. This fact of his, *Samona* did not omit to exaggerate unto the *Emperor*, insonmuch, that by his procurement, an Army was sent against him, which forced *Andronicus*, driven to despair, to quit the limits of the Empire, and flie unto the *Saracens*. A little before, we mentioned *Arbetio*, and it will be worth observing, how he added *deceit* upon *deceit*: When he observed the *Emperor* angry with *Sylvanus*, and feared, that he should come to *Rome* to clear himself of the objected crimes; he gives the *Emperor* his Letters, wherein he called *Sylvanus* to his presence, to an instrument of his own, called *Apodenus*; who arriving in *France*, suppressed the Letters as he was directed, and tells *Sylvanus*, That nothing but destruction hung over him; whereby *Sylvanus* running into Rebellion, as the onely means of his preservation, made good *Arbetio* his calumnies.

But we have too long been silent concerning *Sejanus* (to whom being expert in all these tricks) this artifice we now treat of was very usual. That he might render *Agrippina* suspected to *Tiberius*, He inveigled her friends to puff up her haughty spirit; and her own kintred were inticed to feed the swelling hopes of *Agrippina*, with crooked and perverse discourses; whilst in the interim, he
causes

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causes *Claudia Pulchra*, *Agrippina's* Cosen German, to be accused by *Domitius Afer*; which injury, this fierce and passionate Woman, complaining of heavily to *Tiberius*, did thereby exceedingly encrease the suspicions of this jealous Emperor. Yet *Sejanus* not content with this, but seeking the utter ruine of this unwary, and sorrowful Lady, sent those unto her, who under a show of friendship, should warn her, That *Tiberius* meant to poyson her, and that she should beware of his Feasts; whereupon she over credulous, refused to take an Apple out of *Tiberius* his hand at Table, which grievously incensed *Caesar* against her. By the same *Sejanus* now, when Soldiers were set to watch over *Agrippina* and her Children, were men suborned to advise her, to flee to the German Army, or to run to the Image of *Augustus* for sanctuary; and there to invoke the help of the Senate and the people.

With the same ugly arts, whereby he endeavored to supplant this Lady, by making her suspected of *Tiberius*, he utterly overthrew her friend *Titius Sabinus*; which thing, as it is described by *Tacitus*, you may read here in his own words, because the circumstances are very notable, *Annal.* 4.

“*Junius Silanus* and *Silius Nerva*, being
“*Consuls*, the year had a foul beginning;
for *Titius Sabinus* an honorable Gentleman

“ of

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“ of Rome, was cast into prison onely for
“ his friendship to *Germanicus*, which was
“ such, That he never omitted any occasion
“ of honoring or serving his Wife and
“ Children; Of all *Germanicus* his follow-
“ ers, being the onely man which visited
“ them at their house, and accompanied
“ them abroad; wherefore as he was much
“ praised by the good, so was he much ma-
“ liced by the bad: Against him, *Latinius*
“ *Latiani*, *Porcius Cato*, *Petilius Rufus*, and
“ *Marcus Opius*, who had sometime been
“ Consuls, bent their spight, through a de-
“ sire of the Consulship, which they could
“ not obtain, but by *Sejanus* his means, and
“ *Sejanus* his liberty could not be purchased,
“ but by some notable piece of villany.
“ Wherefore they plotted amongst them,
“ That *Latiani*, who was somewhat a kin to
“ *Sabinus*, should lay the snare, and that
“ the rest being privately witnesses to what
“ past, they might begin their accusation.

“ Hereupon *Latiani* began at first to cast
“ speeches out at randome, and to extol *Sa-*
“ *binus* his constancie, that he did not as
“ others did, fawn in prosperity, and shrink
“ from a house in adversity; with other ho-
“ norable mention of *Germanicus* bewayling
“ *Agrippina's* estate. And seeing *Sabinus*
“ (as mens mindes are soft and tender in
“ calamity) to pour down tears, and
com-

"complaints; *Latiani* began more boldly
 "to touch *Sejanus's* Cruelty, Pride, and Ambi-
 "tion, not forbearing to reproach *Tiberius*;
 "These seeming dangerous speeches, and
 "such as durst not be avouched, made a
 "strict friendship in shew between them:
 "So far that *Sabinus* often frequented *Latiani's*
 "house, and as unto his faithful friend
 "uttered his greifs unto him. Those I
 "mentioned before, now began to devise
 "with *Latiani* how these speeches might be
 "heard by them all: For the place of mee-
 "ting must be in appearance private, and
 "if they should stand behinde the door
 "they did apprehend some noise, or other
 "accident of suspition might discover them;
 "wherefore between the Seeling and the
 "Roof the three Senators (in a place no less
 "unseemly then the Treachery was de-
 "testable) hid themselves, laying their ears
 "close to the holes and chinks, to listen
 "what was said.

"In the mean time *Latiani* having found
 "*Sabinus* in the Market place (as if he had
 "some new matter to tell him, inticeth him
 "home into his chamber, beginning there to
 "rip up things past and present in a great a-
 "boundance; and to load him with new
 "feares. *Sabinus* was not behinde hand
 "with him, the nature of greifs being such,
 "that when once we enter into them, we
 "can

“can hardly make an end. This done, they
“began immediately their accusation,
“and writ unto *Cæsar* the whole contri-
“vance of their own lewd and shameful
“act. The city was never in greater perplex-
“ity, and fear then at that time, every man
“estranging himself from his nearest Kin-
“red, and acquaintance; avoiding all mee-
“tings and conferences as well with their
“Friends, as Strangers; yea they grew jea-
“lous of mute, and senseless things, Prying
“into the Roofs and Walls of their houses.
“But *Tiberius* requesting in his Letters that
“the Solemnities of the new year might be
“Celebrated on the *Calends of January*, falls
“at last upon *Sabinus*, charging him that he
“had corrupted some of his Freed-men to
“attempt something against his person,
“and therefore boldly demandeth a re-
“venge, which without delay was grant-
“ed.

“*Sabinus* being condemned, was drawn
“and haled away with his Garments over
“his head, so that he being almost Throtled
“was heard to cry out: *Is this the beginnings*
“*of the new year? be these the sacrifices slain*
“*in Sejanus his honor?* Which way soever
“he did cast his Eyes they all fled that he
“directed his speech unto; the places of
“Assembly and the Streets were empty,
“some come runing back and showed them-
selves

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"selves again afraid for that they were seen
 "to be afraid. And what days think you
 "now were exempt from executions, if
 "amongst the sacrifices, and the vows, when
 "the custome was to abstain from profane
 "speeches, Fetters and Manacles were
 "mentioned. It is beleev'd *Tiberius* could
 "not be ignorant of the envy he should in-
 "cur for doing so, but that he did it on
 "purpose, to the end the new Magistrates
 "might open the prisons, when they set o-
 "pen their Temples and their Altars. For
 "after that he sent Letters of thanks, for
 "that they had punished an enemy to
 "the State.

CHAP. 29.

*Examples of other treacheries in subor-
ned witnesses, and forged Letters.*

I Cannot avoid bringing here another ex-
 ample out of the same *Historian*. *Firminus*
Cato, a Senator, and one of *Liboes* inward
 freinds induced this simple yong man, easily led to
 vanities, to give credit to the *Chaldeans* pro-
 mises, the *Magicians* ceremonie, and the inter-
 pretation of Dreams, vainly putting him in mind
 that *Pompey* was his Great Grandfather, *Scri-*
bonia who had been *Augustus* his Wife, his
 Aunt;

Aunt; The Cæsars his Cozen Germanes; and that his house was full of the Statues and Monuments of his Ancestors: He inticed him to Licentiousness, to borrow money, making himself a Companion of his Lusts, and Familiarities, the better to intangle him and convince with many evidences. That there might be witnesses enough, he also debauched such of his Servants as knew any thing of the matter. Then he desires access to the Prince, and by means of Flaccus Vescularius, a Gentleman of Rome, one of Tiberius his Familiars, he discovered both the matter and the man. How after this Libo was treated by Tiberius and made much of, until accusations were brought against him in such abundance, that he was forced to kill himself; Tacitus Annal. 2. will tell you at large, to whom I had rather refer you, then exceed the bounds I had proposed to my self in this Treatise.

Styppiota, whose deceit in supplanting Hagiotheoderita, I told you of before, could not avoid being circumvented himself, as Sabinus the Roman was; the contriver of that plot was Camaterus Logotheta, who being an enemy to Styppiota, accused him before the Emperor as an impostor, and one that intended to betray Sicily. And to the end he might give some face of truth to his Calumny, he hides the Emperor in his Chamber, and in his hearing begins on purpose to discourse
of

of the *affairs of Sicily*. At which time many things fell from the heedless *Styppiota* that were very displeasing unto *Cesar*; not content with this, *Camaterus* causes counterfeited Letters to be mingled amongst *Styppiota's Papers*, which being searcht by the *Emperors order*, were the cause of *Styppiota's* condemnation, and the loss of his eyes.

This Story leades me to speak of another means of rendring slanders probable, to wit, by Counterfeiting Letters; A deceit indeed that for the most part breaks out at last to the prejudice of him that uses it, but nevertheless is of great power to make deep impressions of suspicion in the *Princes* mind, and to alienate his favor: Which being once observed by the accused, will either induce him to withdraw himself willingly from business, and the Court, least something worse should follow; or else cast him upon such attempts and practises, as will Confirm the slander. Which appears by that example of *Sylvanus* I mentioned before.

The perfidy of false witnesses is no slender confirmation of slanders, and this is cheifly necessary against such as are accused of *Treason*, and *Capital crimes*; And truly *Domestick Servants* as most proper, so oftneft are made use of in this nature. In the reign of *Arcadius*, *Eutropius* seeking the destruction of *Timasius*, a great Captain, and a
man

man of much authority ; corrupts his freind
or rather his inseparable Com anion *Bargus*
to accuse him of affecting the *Empire*. The
freindship between *Bargus* and *Timasius*
gave credit to the accuser, all men beleieving
that he would not, unless the crime was
most certain, accuse him ; To this Counter-
feit Letters were added, to prove the *Treason*,
by which means the innocent man and his son
were sent into Banishment, to the *Isle of*
Oasis, from whence neither of them ever re-
turned.

Caius Petronius was for his skill in plea-
sures preferd before *Tigellinus* by *Nero* ,
whereupon the other out of envy accused
his Rival of *Scævinius* his friendship, (who
was convicted of a *Conspiracy* against *Nero*)
and brought to witness it a *Servant* of *Pe-*
tronus his corrupted by him.

CHAP. 30.

Confirmation of slanders under the
coulor of a feigned friendship ; and
the inclinations of the Prince to the
accuser.

I Sayd before that to confirm *Calumnies*, the
affection of the *Prince* to the slanderer did
much

much conduce, and for this reason did *Sejanus* endeavoring to make the Empress *Livia* jealous of *Agrippina*, *Germanicus* his Widow, choose *Julius Posthumus* to do it; who, as *Tacitus* affirms, by reason of his Adulteries with *Mutilla Prisca*, the Empresses favorite, was very gracious with *Livia*. But calumnies never succeed so easily, as when they are used against one already suspected by the Prince: For it is very probable, That then the accuser shall not onely ruine the other, but also exalt himself. The Familiars of *Vitellius* durst not set upon *Junius Blasius*, till they observed him to grow less in *Vitellius* his favor, and they compassed their desires much sooner, because *Lucius Vitellius*, the Emperors Brother, lent them his assistance.

Gracchus, a freed man of *Cæsars*, and one as *Tacitus* saith, *Annal.* 13. All his life bried up in, and by a long experience, well practised in the Princes house, thought it the best way to preserve himself in the favor of the Prince, to accuse *Cornelius Sylla*, whom *Nero* he knew was jealous of already. The same art did *Tigellinus* use against this *Sylla*, and *Plautus* afterwards, of which *Tacitus*, *Annal.* 14. writes thus. But *Tigellinus* credit increased daily, who thinking that his lewd practises, wherein he was a great proficient, should be more acceptable, if he could engage the Prince

Prince into the communion of his Villanies, began diligently to pry into all his sears, and perceiving that Plautus and Sylla were above others suspected: Plautus being banished into Asia, and Sylla into France, he entreteth into discourse of their Nobility, and how one was too near the Army of the East, and the other to that of Germany: That Sylla was poor and needy, onely counterfeiting a laziness; and Plautus abounding in wealth, did not so much as pretend a desire of a quiet life.

I told you above of *Ursicinus* accused by *Eusebius* the Eunuch, to the Emperor *Constantius*, who was already shie towards him, by reason of his kinred to *Gaius*; but I did not set down the success of the cause, which was thus. The accusation faulting, because the Arguments whereby the crime was to be proved, were slender; the Eunuch intending a new mischief, causes the accused to be enlarged: And things standing in this posture undecided, he doth strive to indear *Ursicinus* to himself, whom he would seem to have delivered from the danger of a tryal; but withal, removes him from the Court (where all his thoughts were placed) notwithstanding this face of friendship he put on, perswading the Emperor under hand against him.

CHAP. 31.

The chief arts and ways of slanderers.

WHen any one is accused to have spoke ill of the Prince, how much the nearer these reproaches come to truth, by so much the easilier is the accusation credited; as appears in the example of *Granius Marcellus*, of whom *Tacitus*, *Annal.* 1. *Whom Cæpio Crispinus* accused to have reviled *Tiberius*, which was an inevitable accusation, for he having chosen out the greatest blemishes of *Tiberius* his life, did impose them the accused; which because they were true, were believed to have been spoken. This example have many slanderers followed, reproaching many *Princes* of their vices, under pretence of informing them of *other mens detractions*; which one would think should be a sufficient reason to perswade them from giving ear to these *Calumniators*.

And *Tiberius* truly, who though he was a lover of informations, yet he hated his own reproaches; and therefore least he should hear them in the *Senate*, where they were occasionally brought in by way of accusing others, retired to *Caprea*, Believing (as *Tacitus* avers) that he ought to avoid the *Assemblies* of the *Senate*, least he should be compelled to hear

hear reproachful, but yet true, uttered of himself in his own bearing.

This way also do some take onely to reprove Princes for their vices; as they that would reprove Nero for his Mothers murther, did use to inveigh against others for the like acts in his hearing; yet more with a design to correct the fault in Caesar, then to ruine those that they accuse. These are the choicest ways that slander takes, but who will undertake to trace her in all her turnings? For calumny is a monster that hath a thousand shapes, and a thousand sleights to do mischief with.

CHAP. 32.

The deceits and danger of Court-praises, and Masqued Courtiers. Lastly, The third way of oppressing our Courtier by force.

FROM Slanders, let us come to Praises, of which also as we have hinted before, there is great use in undermining others; for many men do by this means, Palliate secret Hate, Envy, and Emulation, to the end, they may deceive more easily. So Fabius Valens with secret criminations, defamed Martius Valens that suspected no such thing from him; who

to betray him more securely, did always speak well of him in publike, Tacitus Hist. 1. So Arbetio with the blandishments of a great kindness, did assault Ursicinus, and frequently call him in publike, A valiant gallant person, thereby craftily to intangle in more deadly snares, that harmless, and well-meaning man. Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. 15.

Alphonfus, King of Arragon, as one was praising another man unreasonably in his presence, beyond his wont, turning about to a friend said, Without doubt this fellow seeks the destruction of him he praises: Neither was the King deceived in his opinion, for six moneths after, this intemperate praiser, accused before the seat of Justice, him that he had so highly extolled; and had undone him, had not the King interposed for his preservation.

Mucianus having in the Senate heaped many praises upon Antonius Primus, whom he could not openly oppress; loads him also with secret promises, and points him out the further Spain, left void for him by the decease of Cluvius Rufus, giving to his friends and followers, several commands in the Army. And afterward, when he had filled him with ambition, and desire, he suddenly undermines his power by taking from him the Seventh Legion, which was exceedingly devoted to Anthony.

Neither

Neither is this way traced by Courtiers onely, but also by Princes themselves, when they desire to abate or take down any body. For *Tiberius* did thus confer the *Pratorship* upon, and invite to his Table, *Libo*, (whom he secretly suspected and hated) without change of countenance or showing anger in his words, till he saw his time (he had so concealed his indignation) as *Tacitus* tells you, *Annal.* 2. By the same artifice, you saw he overthrew *Sejanus*: *Domitian* was never more to be feared, then when he smiled; the praises of *Andronicus* were the beginning of injuries. *Nicetas* called his liberality, An earnest of the confiscation of that mans goods, and his lenity a forerunner of a certain death.

Yet there are some that seek by their applauses onely, to stir up the Princes envy towards them they praise, for so *Tacitus* tells, *Julius Agricola* was ruined with *Domitian*. The cause of his destruction was no Crime nor Complaint against him, but the Princes envy to the vertues and glory of the man, stirred up by the worst kinde of enemies, unseasonable and treacherous praisers. There is extant, a saying of the Emperor *Julian*, That there are no more dangerous Enemies in the world, then *Masked Courtiers*; whom *Mammertinus* describes in a *Panegyrick*, saying, That with a crafty artifice they did in all company, slander

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men by way of Praises, and under the titles of friendship.

But we see that some have used these praises towards one, with an intention of reproaching another, whom they desired to affront with the dissimilitude of his merit; *Plutarch* accuses *Herodotus* with this spiteful kinde of dealing in his commendations of the *Athenians*, for the brave repulse they gave the *Persians*, which saith he, was not intended so much for the *Athenians* honor, as the shame and disgrace of the other *Greeks*. *Seneca* attests, that *Kings* are wont to praise their dead servants, to make those blush that are alive: So did *Augustus* extol the faithful services of *Mæcenæ*, and *Agrippa*, when his daughters lusts being discovered, he seeking thereby to reprove his familiars and servants, as negligent and careless of the honor and service of their Prince.

The same was *Augustus* his end in praising and dispraising of *Tiberius*, of whom *Tacitus* writes thus; *Augustus* when a few years before he demanded the *Tribunical* power in the Senate for *Tiberius*, although he did in his speech touch upon many things of his behavior, his habit, and maner of living; which, as it were, by way of excuse he did reproach him with, &c. Therefore these things ought to warn us to look as well into the intention of those that praise us, as of those that calumniate us.

These

These two first ways of undermining our Courtier, to wit, Of removing him out of the way, under some fair pretence; or, of making him hated, or suspected by the Prince; being sufficiently discoursed of, there remains one-ly untouched, the third and last way of all, Open violence; which principally takes place, when either the people or the soldiery offended with the dignity, or maner of the favorite, run into a publike sedition. The tumults of the *Parisians*, when the people raged at the captivity of their King John, with the *English*, are sufficiently known; as also the fortune of those, upon that sedition, who bore the principal offices under his Son, then supplying his Fathers place in the Government.

But few years since, the *Janizaries*, more then once, have by sedition deprived the *Turkish Emperors* of their *Ministers* of greatest trust and authority: Out of more ancient stories, the time of *Arcadius* will furnish us with some examples; *Ruffinus* was amongst others, principally beloved by this Emperor, with whom *Stilico* being offended, and determining his destruction, sent *Gainas* with his forces, as it were, to assist the Emperor, but indeed to deprive him of *Ruffinus*, as it came to pass: For *Ruffinus* going to the Army, the Soldiers of *Gainas* upon the signal given, ran together, and com-

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passing *Ruffinus* in, tore him in pieces.

Eutropius being then put in *Ruffinus* his place; when the chief *Courtiers* likewise grew discontented with him, by the contrivance of the same *Gainas*, *Tribigildus* raises a Rebellion, overrunning and spoiling all *Asia*, and denies to accept any conditions of a peace, till *Eutropius* were removed out of the way; which by the persuasion of *Gainas*, the Emperor consented at last unto: Neither was this enough, for *Gainas* being afterward openly joyned with *Tribigildus*, to the end he might suffer himself to be reconciled to *Arcadius* the Emperor, demanded, That *Aurelius Saturnius*, and *John Chrysostome*, then the chief Moderators of the Emperors Affairs, should be given up to him; which being done, he sent them into banishment, contenting himself with giving them (before their departure out of his presence) the Edge of his Sword for to handle, that they might feel how sharp it was.

CHAP.

CHAP. 33.

Sometimes the Princes own ill and cruel Nature, envying the deserts of his Servants, is cause of the Courtiers fall; and this, how it is to be handled.

Ofentimes, although our Courtiers underprop themselves with all other supports, yet the nature of the Prince, as being either over light, vain, jealous, envious, covetous, cruel, or timorous, makes their ruine inevitable. These diseases as being incorporated into them, do for the most part elude, and overgrow the circumspection of the prudentest men. Seneca, whose authority had with Nero far more of liberty, then flattery; in the beginning, being wise and skilful in the arts of Court, was faine to yield at last, as quite overcome by the malice of the Princes nature: First, he was envied by him for his eloquence, then for his riches, and lastly, being oppress'd with malicious slanders, he lost both the Princes favor, and his life.

The jealousie and envy of Princes, hath been so formidable to some, that they had rather be lessened to their loss, then incur their envy by doing their business prosperously and well. Publius Ventidius fearing

the envy of *Mark Anthony*, under whom he served, contented himself to have beaten the *Parthians* by three Victories into *Media*, and would not prosecute his good fortune any farther. *Agathias* tells us, that during the Reign of *Justinian*, the same was done by *Bellisarius*; least the greatness of his Victories, and the acclamations of the people, should stir up the hate of the *Peers*, and envy of the *Prince* against him.

Truly such as these do not minde their own honor, and the profit of the *Prince*, as they ought to do; but the fault is not so much in them, as in the *Prince* himself; And therefore it was, that *Mecenas* perswaded *Augustus*, not to impute his ill successes to his *Ministers*, nor envy their prosperous actions. For (saith he) many of them that manage *Publique* affairs, have done it very negligently, for fear of envy, choosing rather to hazard their glory, then their safety. Yet I do much more approve their way, who to avoid envy, whatever great and fortunate actions they did, would needs ascribe the glory of it to the *Prince*, though absent. *Agrippa*, *Augustus* his Son in Law, perswades us to undertake great adventures; but having performed them to attribute the glory of it to the *Prince*, as he himself was always wont to do.

So *Joab* besiedging *Rabatham*, though he could, refused to take it in, before *David* himself

himself came thither. *Craterus* when the business of *Artacena* was to be determined, waits for *Alexanders* coming; *Julius Agricola* (as *Tacitus* writes) never did boastingly apply his acts to his own glory, but cast all upon Fortune, as the author and guide of all he did, who was but her servant.

This envy and emulation, though they are diseases incident to the generousest Princes (such as *Philip* and *Alexander* were) yet they are more predominant and malignant in some, then others. *Theodosius*, the second Emperor of that name, committed the charge of building a Wall at *Constantinople* from Sea to Sea unto *Cyrus*, which work he effecting in threescore days; This great dispatch was so grateful to the people, that they cryed out in the streets, That *Constantine* built the City, and *Cyrus* had restored it; which being heard by the Emperor, brought so great an envy upon *Cyrus*, that he could not expiate it any other way, but by putting on a Religious habit.

He that hath to do with such Princes, is to consider, That he walks upon ashes, under which fire lies concealed; and therefore must he still examine their inclinations with great diligence, to the end, he may either defend himself against them; or, if it fall out that he cannot, that he may have this satisfaction of minde at least, That he hath done

his duty, and all that in Prudence he ought.

CHAP. 34.

*How to preserve our Favor and Office,
with the succeeding Prince.*

HE is deservedly to be remembred amongst the *Darlings of Fortune*, whose Authority and Interest being great with one Prince, continues so with his Successor. It is truly a thing very rare in Courts, because he that is to succeed, is for the most part suspected by the present Prince; and therefore, they who manage his affairs, are necessitated to be adverse unto the Heir apparent; from whence, commonly deadly enmities arise. Besides this also, the succeeding Prince hath for the most part Servants known, and endeared unto him, by a long fidelity, and many services; for whose advancement to dignity that he may make way, he will ordinarily, either of his own accord, or by the perswasion of those that desire to succeed, lay aside the Servants of the deceased Prince.

Yet there are some, whom either the state of affairs, for which they are more able, and

and apt then others; or some other dexterous quality, and taking humor, doth so insinuate them into the succeeding Prince, That one Prince dying, they loose nothing thereby, but his person. Macro, that he might obtain Caligula his favor, sets his own wife Ennia upon him, to inveigle him with love, and binde him in a marriage. The same man commanded Tiberius to be smothered with clothes, as he was sick and dying, as Tacitus affirms. Julian the Emperor retained Arbetio still, because he thought him useful, although he hated him for his pride, and turbulent disposition. And Valentinian after him, called the same man unto him to oppose against Procopius.

We have hitherto handled onely such things as our Courtier, who will enjoy the Princes favor, ought to avoid; But the sum of all Counsels that can here be given to him, is, A modesty towards the Prince, such as becomes a man, more mindful of his duty, then of his swelling fortune; let him never boast, nor do any thing irreverently; and as much as possibly he can, let him avoid envy; which hath been so dreadful to many, and those great men, That some of them with pretending a love of ease, others imbracing a retirement to study, have showed themselves averse to publique affairs. Examples in both which cases, the Historians give us in Domitian

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tian and Galba. He must take heed, he pass not over carelessly, either those treacherous kinde of praises we spoke of before, nor the slanders that are cast upon him: They that Calumniate us, do say, That either we are wanting in some thing that is necessary to serve the Prince well; or else, That we have said, or done something, either really, or intentionally, to the prejudice of him, or his service. As to the defects imputed unto us, we must either modestly excuse, and justifie our selves, or else amend them; or lastly, endeavor with some other vertues to recompence those wants. Our words and actions ought to be so moderated, and weighed, That they may not be obnoxious to ill interpretations; we ought always to endeavor to search into other mens opinions, and inclinations, before we discover our own; And if either by chance or negligence, any thing slip from us, which may possibly offend, we must when we reflect upon it, by some respective means, or by some kinde of occasional interpretation, amongst other discourse, let them see, what we spoke was not with an intention of offending any body.

If we shall once discover, that we are calumniated by any one, we ought as little as may be, be absent from the Prince, to whom we are slandered; for besides that, love abates towards those that are absent, detraction also in time takes root, if it be not seasonably

seasonably contradicted with truth; for a jealousie being once put into the *Princes* head, in time through the many suggestions of the accuser, there being no body to gainsay; takes such footing at last, That oftentimes the *Prince* hates the person accused, before he examines the crime.

He therefore that will provide for his safety, must make himself at Court, one friend or more, to defend him in his absence against the dangerous assaults of *Calumny*: But withal, he must take care they be persons of Condition and Honor, or at least, men of Interest, and such as have access to the *Prince's* ear, as readily as our *Enemies*. I confess, the store of such *Friends* in Court, is but very small, where it is the usual custom, almost amongst all, if not to persecute their companions themselves, at least to suffer them to be oppressed by others. But yet it happens sometimes, That there is one that either out of gratitude for benefits received, or with a desire of obliging us, or else out of hatred, towards our accusers, will perform that office.

CHAP. 35.

Ostentation of the Prince's favor, to be avoided : Something also concerning our Friends and followers.

LEt our Courtier avoid all ostentation of the Princes favor, not onely to eschew the envy of the rest of his Companions, but also of the Prince himself : For lately, when the *Grandees* of Spain went about to supplant Cardinal *Spinosa*, under *Philip* the Second, see with what a wile they circumvented him : They all struck sail to him, they all seemed to acknowledge, that their fortunes depended upon his favor ; the very domestick servants of the King, shewed themselves very obedient, and ready at his beck : Which when the Prince observed, he was removed from Court, and all that power and greatness which he had acquired, in less then two years fell to nothing.

Let therefore our Courtier learn to be contented with a modest train of attendants, and with a rate of living rather beneath the dignity wherewith he is honored by the Prince, then above it ; which he must be sure never to exceed. It is unseasonable to lessen your attendants, when your fortune is declining. It availed *Seneca* nothing, after
he

he had lost *Neroes* favor, to hide himself in his private house, and betake himself to his studies, nor to shut out visitants with his pretence of want of health. Neither did it advantage *Agricola* a whit, to have entred the City by night, and with a slender company of followers: Wherefore it is necessary, That we put on a face of modesty betimes, and hold on so.

Yet although I would not have our Courtier be besieged with too great a throng of Friends and Servants, I would not have him neglect to make many Creatures and Followers; not to serve him in his pomp, but to support and comfort him, if any adversity should happen: For although an adverse Fortune findes few of these prove friends, yet there are for the most part, some among them who will endeavor to shelter and assist you; if not out of friendship, yet out of respect to their own advantage, which they may well expect from the restoration of your Fortune.

CHAP. 36.

*How to manage and dispenſe the Princes favor, advices, and comforts in ad-
versity, with other rules.*

BUT as it is a great content and help in ad-
versity, to have communicated your proſpe-
rity freely and generously to many, in using
the favor of the Prince, to their assistance
and advantage; so our Courtier is to be warn-
ed, That he warily and industriously di-
spence these benefits; for it is certain, That
whatsoever the Prince shall at our intreaty
do for any man, a great part of it is by him
imputed, as done to us. Wherefore, unless
the Princes favor towards us, be very large,
we must not be too prodigal of sharing it
amongst others: And very seldom must we
introduce or commend any unto the Prince, who
are not in some measure known unto him, as
well as to our selves, whose deserts we ought
first carefully to look into, observing that
saying of Horace.

*Till thou art certain what his vertues be,
In no mans praises be thou over-free;
Least he transgress, and purchase shame to thee.*

Moreover, let those favors also, which you
demand for any body from the Prince, be
fit

fit for the person, and suitable with the times, consistant also with the dignity, and emolument of the Prince; and lastly, such as you know have been formerly obtained by others. If the Prince grants it, we must let him see we take it as a great favor done unto our selves; if he refuse, we must take heed that he do not perceive we are offended.

That is also to be observed here, which we have touched upon before, That we must never vainly make show of the Princes favor, nor give it out, That he is governed by us; for we have told you before, how ill that succeeded with some. Princes whatsoever they do, desire to be thought to do it of themselves, without the help and authority of any others, especially their Subjects.

If the Prince shall lay any weighty command upon us, we endeavor to have it in writing, and as clearly interpreted unto us, as is possible: We must not omit to represent unto him, such difficulties before we undertake the business, as we apprehend will occur unto us in the execution. If it be a thing committed to us in secrecie, and unfit to be written, we are to repeat the Commands over and over (yet without absurdity) in the Princes presence, to the end we may better understand the intention of him that gives them, and also that he may not forget what orders he gave us.

We.

We must also show our selves ready for the *meanest imployments* the *Prince* will cast upon us; for many times a small matter is the occasion of a great fortune; and *Princes* would have their commands to be weighed not by the importance of the affair, but by the greatness and dignity of him the giver; being no less incensed at our refusal of *sleight enterpises*, then our declining of great and *hazardous undertakings*, when imposed by him upon us. When we are attending upon the *Prince*, we ought to watch diligently, that we be not surprised nor overwhelmed with sudden commands; And to that end, always as much as may be, we ought to ruminate before hand all things then afoot, and to prepare our minde and understanding for whatever may come in agitation. We must likewise take heed, that we importune not the *Prince* with unseasonable nor impertinent discourses, but onely with what we both know to be certain, and judge to be fit for him to hear. When the *Prince* speaks, we must appear attentive, not as if we thought of something else; not sad, not musing, least we should seem either to sleight, or dislike what he says.

If any one disgusted, or injured by the *Prince*, shall come and make his complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his misfortune; perswading him to patience, and
silence,

silence, and encouraging him to hope well; lessening the injury, and excusing the Prince. But with such as these, we must deal warily, for there are those that counterfeite wrongs and discantents, to see if they can draw any testimony of an ill will to the Prince out of us, that thence they may take an occasion to undo us: Others are injured indeed, but yet are weak and imprudent, not being able to conceal what is out of friendship communicated to them in secret.

If our condition be such, that we keep a train of servants, we are to take great care that none of them speak licentiously, either of the Prince, or his Favorites; for many times the servants fault is cast upon the Master, from whom his words and actions are often thought to proceed. Amongst the principal rules of a Courtiers Prudence, this is one, To discover and smell out betimes, the change and diminution of the Princes affection towards us, to the end, that the knot of love between you, may rather be gently untied, then cut in sunder. For so many times the cause of our distaste being removed, or worn away, there is sometimes an easie return for us unto our former favor, especially, if we seem, either not to remember, or not to have understood the injury.

CHAP. 37.

How to make a judgement of the constancy, or change of the Princes affection to us.

TO the end our *Courtier* may judge of the constancy of the *Prince's* favor towards him, It is not enough that he know the *Princes* humor, with the authority and power, both of his friends and enemies in Court; but, he must principally weigh the original cause of the *Prince's* love towards him: For, if that once cease, or be found more prevalent in another, without doubt, the affection of the *Prince* will either wholly cool, or at least be much diminished.

Yet sometimes it is hard to divine what is the reason, that you are so beloved; and truly, it is sometimes onely a fortunate felicity, for which no reason can be given, though ordinarily the *Princes* love arises, either out of similitude of disposition, out of the pleasingness of your humor and maners, out of your services done him, or from your vertue; or lastly, from your obsequious pliability to his will. That love which comes from the similitude, or takingness of your maners, although it seem very great for a time, yet it wears out soonest of all; both, because as we have said before
the

the nature of man changes daily with age, or with variety of business; and also, because it is hard to finde two dispositions so sympathizing together, as that they differ in nothing; and many times that wherein they differ, is of more power to divide them, then all the rest to unite them together.

Yet I know not *what Star* doth so tune and temper some men still to the *Princes* liking, and disposition, that they can hardly, if they would, do any *dissonant or displeasing thing to him*: And I do confess, That these men may make the *best harvest*, with a *Prince* of all others; especially, if they know skilfully how to choose and use their times, and how to take in their sails seasonably before a storm.

CHAP. 38.

The Princes favor to Women: Instructions for the Princes Mistresses; benefits conferred on Princes, often makes those persons hated by them, with other documents.

P*rinces* do sometimes also bestow this favor on *Women*, according as they are more

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more or less prone to venereal pleasures ; but they also do frequently fall from favor, if not by their own faults , yet out of the *Princes* satiety, or finding out a fairer *Mistress*. Wherefore, such *Women* as are crafty, are wont to divert *Princes*, as much as may be, from all commerce with other *Women*, especially such as may be likely to intangle the *Princes* minde ; some also, by counterfeiting disdain, and keeping state, have preserved their lover ; and lastly, some more audacious and bold , when they saw the *Prince* once truly love them, have kept him still drunk in lust, and drowned in pleasure.

Which arts *Poppæa* practised upon *Nero*, For when she saw that he was enamored of her, becoming proud, if she entertained him a night or two, it was all she could afford him ; saying, She was a married wife, and could not abandon her Husband *Otho* , who for his parts and behavior exceeded *Nero* : That in using a Bond-slave, as for his Concubine, had learned nothing from that servile familiarity, but baseness and nigardice : Thus *Tacitus* reports her discourses, *Annal.* 13. And soon after, *Annal.* 14. the same *Poppæa* despairing now of marrying *Nero*, or of seeing him divorced from *Octavia*, as long as *Agrippina* lived : Sometimes tauntingly, and sometimes merrily, began to reproach the *Prince* , calling him a *Ward*, and subject to others

others controulment; and said, he was so far from the Government of the Empire, that he wanted his own liberty. Some Princes Mistresses have by this means held their affections faster, then by the dallyings and blandishments of pleasure; yet, as I said before, there is no constancy in this kinde of affection to be relied upon long.

Truly one would think that love, which you have gained by your services, should be stable and more firm, then what comes from flattery or pleasure, as arising out of an honest cause; and which being cherished in you, is apt to stir up others to merit as well by vertuous undertakings. Yet experience often teaches us, that very great services have in Courts been the ruine of those that have performed them; by reason, that Princes are wont to hate, whom they cannot requite. They will not be indebted to a subject, and therefore do fly the sight of those that have exceeding well deserved of them, as if they did with their looks reproach them of ingratitude; which is the reason, why the condition of such men in Courts, is much to be pittied; for when they have obliged the Prince by any service, they are ashamed by and by, to ask a reward, least they should seem not to have given, but sold the benefit they did him; who in the mean time, as Princes are often regardless of the

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the service received, and slow to reward, draws out, day after day, till the memory of the benefit wears out in the mindes of those that were privy to it; whose silent reproaches he feared before.

Which some men observing, have judged it fit, to strike the Iron whilst it was hot; and when they were designed for any business, to look to their reward, before they undertook the imployment; knowing well, that with Princes the hope of future services, is more prevalent to induce reward, then the memory of those that are past; and that it is better to be obliged to Princes, then to have them obliged to us; because they believe, whoever they have obliged, to wish well to them, whilst he that they are indebted unto, because he is believed not to love the Prince that hath denied him, what he pretended unto; is recompenced onely with hate. This Commynes tells us, was Lewis the Eleventh his opinion.

The love of Princes towards the Ministers of their pleasure, would seem to be stable; and truly, it is of some continuance, as long as the inclinations of the Prince to pleasure continue; but those changing, the affections to those that sed them, change also. Sometimes likewise, the Prince inclining to the love of vertue, doth reject and abominate those that are instruments of his pleasures.

pleasures. But as some of the inclinations of Princes are more durable then others, so also is their favor (as I said) of a proportioned continuance, towards the Servants of those veral inclinations.

CHAP. 39.

Sundry precepts concerning the Pleasures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c.

I Will not touch here upon all pleasures, whereunto the nature of the Prince is prone, because all of them are not fit, or apt to have the greatness of any mans fortune built upon them. Those passions that are of any greatest sway in Princes mindes, and familiar unto them, are three, to wit, Wanton love, Cruelty, and Avarice: The first, as it is more vehement then all the rest, so it is more incertain, and inconstant; for though the vice still remains as to the Subject, yet it keeps not fixed still upon the same object: Nevertheless, many have used this as a foundation, wherenpon to build their fortunes, not sticking to prostitute their Wives, so they might gain the favor of the Prince; as we read in Tacitus, that Otho did, although it

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fell not out well with him ; for Nero removed him from Court, least he should have a rival there.

Others that they might binde their Princes unto them, made themselves *Witnesses* and *Companions* of their wickedness and lusts, by the example of *Tigellinus*. These men do not think that Princes have a trick to free themselves of *publike blame* and *envy*, to sacrifice oftentimes such kinde of men unto it : And all those servants of their lusts are to expect the same fortune as hapned to *Remirus de Orco*, the Minister of *Cesar Borgia* his cruelties ; whom at last, *Borgia* caused to be murdered, as guilty of all the ill that he had done.

And from the example of this *Remirus*, we may also read their destiny, who serve the Prince in his cruelties ; for the Prince's affection seldom endures towards them, both because he doth, as it were, daily read his wickedness in seeing them, and also is afraid of them, whom he knows so apt to villainy. *Nero* although hardned in vice, and of a cruel nature, yet after his Mothers death hated *Anicetus*, as one whose face daily reproached him with his Mothers murder.

The affections of *Avarice* are least of all changeable ; the diversity of the object doth not vary in these, as in those of love ; it is not diminished, but encreases with age ; and although

Although it is as hateful to the people, as cruelty, yet it is longer endured, because it covers and cloaks all exactions, under the pretence of *Publique necessity*, *Parsimony*, and the *Common good*. Therefore, those that upon this score serve *Princes*, may long preserve themselves in their favor, whilst (which is rare in these kinde of men) they do not become froward and peevish, nor too much intend in-
riching themselves.

Frowardness, which for the most part is likewise *contumelious*, begets hatred both to the *Prince*, and to it self; The author of which, the *Prince* will at last cast away, to remove the *envy* of it from himself.

Riches are also obnoxious to *envy*, not of the people onely, but sometimes of the *Prince* himself; who if he be truly *avaricious*, will hardly be content, till he have squeezed the full *Sponge*, as we read that *Vespasian* was wont to do; but will rather imitate the *Country Clowns*, who when they have fatted their *Hogs*, do kill and devour them. Truly, *France* hath seen many such, who being proud and peevish, and who making too much hast to be rich, have thereby, and by their insolence, from a great height of fortune, fallen to nothing.

In the time of *Philip le Belle*, *Peter Berchius*, High Chamberlain, and Treasurer of *France*, was strangled at *Paris*; *Lewis*,

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Philips Son, afterward coming to the Crown, *Enguerrandus Marigny* met with the same misfortune: Under *Charls* the Seventh, *Gyacensis*, in dignity equal to *Berchias*, was brought to the Bar, and afterwards sowed in a Sack, and drowned; his Successor *Camus Beaulieu* was killed at *Poytiers*; and the same end had come under *Philip* the First, to *Peter Essart*, if with an Hundred thousand *Florens* he had not redeemed his life.

I could recount more neerer us, but that I am willing to spare their memory: In the mean time these examples are sufficient to instruct, That as the too great easiness of these *Ministers* brings too great a detriment upon the *Princes* profit; so their insolent griping, and frowardness, draws hate and destruction upon themselves: And that as we ought not to refuse a just occasion of enriching our selves, so we must not show our selves too greedy after riches, nor amass so much together, as may expose us to the *Publique Envy*.

CHAP.

CHAP. 40.

Concluding with many choice, and necessary Admonitions.

THere remains onely now unhandled the last cause, why Courtiers are beloved by their Princes; to wit, An aptness, and singular ability to dispatch, and manage their Affairs: For which reason, When we see that we are become acceptable to the Prince, we must consider, Whether he love this aptness for business, because of the usefulness and necessity of it; or else, because the Prince desires to acquire from us that aptitude to himself. If it be grateful, because it is necessary, his favor to us will endure as long as the necessity remains; but his love, will rather be a forced, then voluntary love.

If we see the Prince aspire to the glory of this aptitude for business, there is no doubt, but when he sees, that he cannot either equal, or excel us, we shall become an eye-sore, and unacceptable to him; for there is in Prince; an innate desire, as well as in all other men, of excelling all persons in those arts they addict themselves unto; and therefore no man, almost, is pleased to be excelled in them by his own servant. *Asinius Pollio*, some exhorting him to make a reply to those Verses

Augustus Cesar had made against him, answered, That he would not by contending to seem the better Scribe, draw his envy upon him, that had power to proscrib him. There arising a dispute once between Favorinus the Philosopher, and the Emperor Adrian, about some word, wherein the Philosopher at last seemed to yeild; his Friends wondring at it, he said, I am not ashamed to be overcome in knowledge by him, that commands Thirty Legions.

To this purpose, that saying of Solomon is very notorious, Do not seem wise before the King. It is necessary therefore, That who-soever desires to purchase a Princes favor, must set aside the desire of his own glory; and not onely in verbal disputes, but in every thing else, yeild him the day: And to that end, it will not be amiss, on purpose to commit some errors and over-sights; so that they be not too gross, nor like to take too much from our repete.

Out of our discourse hitherto, it is evident, how little certainty is in all the greatness and favor at Court; Wherefore, the best counsel that can be given to all Courtiers, is, To prepare themselves for their fall; for although it is thought a more generous thing to fight, then to flie, when you are once entered these lists; yet if you are to do it with greater hazard of danger, then hope of success,
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it is not indiscreet to sound a retreat betimes, and in imitation of the Parthians, to fight flying.

As it is also a more glorious thing to descend gently by steps, and as it were, to go out at the door, then to be cast headlong out at the Window; so it is less shameful, under colour of some specious and contrived pretences, to bid adieu to your Honors and Offices, then to expect to be stript disgracefully of them: And hereunto may fitly be applied the saying of an ancient Roman.

Why dost thou weary tired Fortune so?

Depart the Court, before thou art forc'd to go.

Seneca says, it is happiness to die in the midst of your felicity; but I on the other side think That Courtier happy, who in the midst of his prosperous race makes a retreat. Perhaps he that shall do so, shall not be applauded by all, but by some that look upon the outsidés of things, be judged unworthy of the Fortune that he hath so abandoned. Yet he that is wise, not regarding such idle discourses, will provide for his own safety, and remember, that in all games, it is better to give over a winner, then a loser; as also, that no prudent man will exchange or adventure certain things, for things so very uncertain.

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Though our ascent to these heights of Fortune and Dignities, is, as it were, by steps in order; yet our descents, if not timely foreseen, are for the most part headlong, and suddain: So that those that are flourishing in Favor and Authority, if they chance once to slip, or stumble, their falls are lightly desperate and fatal.

Behold here the Compendium of all, that I desired to say, for our Courtiers instruction: Whether these precepts be pertinent, and select or no, I will not determine, but leave that to the judgement and experience of my Friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no great use of them, and am so far from being transported with sadness, at my private and retired condition, that I do heartily say with Seneca;

Let him that pleases, stand upon
The slippery Battlements of Court:
I am well content to live alone,
Obscure, and free from all resort.
A sweet retirement I desire,
To all things that are Great unknown:
Where I to Verue may aspire;
Therewith my latter days to Crown.

That

*That so when Time hath stoln away
My health, and scarcely left me breath,
Without disturbance, finde I may
A quiet, and a happy death.
And that may cheerfully imbrace,
As being terrible to none
But those, who known in every place,
Die onely to themselves unknown.*

FINIS.
